Corporate Control, Crime, and Compensation: An Empirical Examination of Large Corporations

This study investigates whether the agency cost of corporate crime leading to executive pay is greater when monitoring and incentive alignment activities by principals is low. The results indicate that executive compensation is positively associated with the incidence of corporate crime in manager c...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inHuman relations (New York) Vol. 48; no. 8; pp. 891 - 908
Main Author Bilimoria, Diana
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Thousand Oaks, CA SAGE Publications 01.08.1995
Kluwer Academic
Plenum
Plenum Press, etc
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Subjects
Behavior
Boards of directors
Business management
Chief executive officers
Comparison
Compensation
Compensation plans
Corporate crime
Corporate culture
Corporate governance
Costs
Crime
Decision making
Enterprises
Ethics
Executive compensation
Owners
Regulation
Responsibility accounting
Sociology
Sociology of organizations and enterprises. Bureaucracy and administration
Sociology of work and sociology of organizations
Stockholders
Studies
Top management
USA
White collar crime
United States > US
legal violations
corporate governance
corporate crime
illegal behavior
corporate control
CEO compensation
Firm Management
Deviance
Efficiency
Enterprise
Social Control
Cost
Landlord
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:This study investigates whether the agency cost of corporate crime leading to executive pay is greater when monitoring and incentive alignment activities by principals is low. The results indicate that executive compensation is positively associated with the incidence of corporate crime in manager controlled firms but not in owner controlled firms. Implications for the monitoring of business activities in owner and manager controlled firms are developed.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ObjectType-Article-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
ISSN:0018-7267
1741-282X
DOI:10.1177/001872679504800804