Who Will Deregulate the Deregulators?

A well-intentioned and fully informed regulator may determine that the optimal policy is to deregulate the market, yet the regulator may be constrained from doing so. In this condition, deregulatory policies originate in exogenous shocks to the regulator's choice environment. Entrepreneurship i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPublic choice Vol. 142; no. 3/4; pp. 379 - 384
Main Author Lopez, Edward J
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Boston Springer 01.03.2010
Springer US
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Airline deregulation
Aviation regulation
Commercial regulation
Competition
Costs
Deregulation
Economic policy
Economic regulation
Economic rent
Economics
Economics and Finance
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurship
Environmental regulation
Institutional change
Lobbying
Market theory
Markets
Organizational change
Policy making
Political economy
Political power
Political Science
Political systems
Politics
Price ceilings
Price regulation
Public Finance
Railroad deregulation
Regulation
Rents
Studies
Telecommunications deregulation
Transportation regulation
Wage & price controls
Zoning ordinances
Deregulation
Regulation
L43
Institutional change
D78
Entrepreneurship
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Summary:A well-intentioned and fully informed regulator may determine that the optimal policy is to deregulate the market, yet the regulator may be constrained from doing so. In this condition, deregulatory policies originate in exogenous shocks to the regulator's choice environment. Entrepreneurship in political and economic markets is a primary source of institutional change that promotes deregulation.
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ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-009-9537-5