Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach

The problem of choosing an efficient alternative by a group of agents with conflicting interests is addressed. It is assumed that the agents are fully informed and that an uninformed designer has to reach a decision that will affect all of them. A simple and straightforward mechanism whose Nash equi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe American economic review Vol. 92; no. 5; pp. 1577 - 1587
Main Authors Pérez-Castrillo, David, Wettstein, David
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Nashville American Economic Association 01.12.2002
Subjects
Auctions
Bidding
Bids
Design
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Efficient strategies
Environment
Equilibrium
Externality
Game theory
Games
Hazardous waste
Mathematical vectors
Mechanism design
Nash equilibrium
Public good
Public goods
Radioactive waste
Radioactive wastes
Shorter Papers
Studies
Surplus
Transfer payments
Waste management
United States > US
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Summary:The problem of choosing an efficient alternative by a group of agents with conflicting interests is addressed. It is assumed that the agents are fully informed and that an uninformed designer has to reach a decision that will affect all of them. A simple and straightforward mechanism whose Nash equilibria realize any efficient outcome that satisfies intuitively appealing lower bounds on the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the participating agents is constructed. The mechanism could operate in environments with asymmetric information.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
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ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/000282802762024647