Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence

• Published in: International journal of philosophical studies : IJPS Vol. 7; no. 1; pp. 69 - 88
• Main Author: Wrathall, Mark A.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Abingdon Taylor & Francis 01.03.1999
• Subjects: Correspondence; Disclosing; Discovering; Heidegger; Martin Heidegger; Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language; Philosophy; Truth; Unconcealment; Belief; Dasein; Appropriation; Tradition; Statement;Utterance; Discovery; Propositional; Representation; World; Heidegger (M.); Aletheia; Exactness; Unhiding; Correspondence; Object; Greek; Truth; Communication; Essence
• ISSN: 0967-2559; 1466-4542
• DOI: 10.1080/096725599341974

I argue in this paper that Heidegger, contrary to the view of many scholars, in fact endorsed a view of truth as a sort of correspondence. I first show how it is a mistake to take Heidegger's notion of 'unconcealment' as a definition of propositional truth. It is thus not only possible but also essential to disambiguate Heidegger's use of the word 'truth', which he occasionally used to refer to both truth as it is ordinarily understood and unconcealment understood as the condition of the possibility of truth. I then show how Heidegger accepted that propositional truth, or 'correctness', as he sometimes called it, consists in our utterances or beliefs corresponding to the way things are. Heidegger's objection to correspondence theories of truth was not directed at the notion of correspondence as such, but rather at the way in which correspondence is typically taken to consist in an agreement between representations and objects. Indeed, Heidegger took his account of unconcealment as explaining how it is possible for propositions to correspond to the world, thus making unconcealment the ground of propositional truth. I conclude by discussing briefly some of the consequences for Heidegger interpretation which follow from a correct understanding of Heidegger's notion of propositional truth.