A General Theory of Objectivity: Contributions from the Reformational Philosophy Tradition

• Published in: Foundations of science Vol. 27; no. 3; pp. 941 - 955
• Main Authors: Gunton, Richard M., Stafleu, Marinus D., Reiss, Michael J.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.09.2022; Springer; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Book publishing; Education; Mathematical Logic and Foundations; Methodology of the Social Sciences; Objectivity; Philosophy; Philosophy of Science; Social sciences; United Kingdom; Relation-frames; Objective; Bias; Replication; Representation; Subjective; Kant
• ISSN: 1233-1821; 1572-8471
• DOI: 10.1007/s10699-021-09809-x

Objectivity in the sciences is a much-touted yet problematic concept. It is sometimes held up as characterising scientific knowledge, yet operational definitions are diverse and call for such paradoxical genius as the ability to see without a perspective, to predict repeatability, to elicit nature’s own self-revelation, or to discern the structure of reality with inerrancy. Here we propose a positive and general definition of objectivity based on work in the Reformational philosophy tradition. We recognise a suite of relation-frames–ways in which things function and relate to each other, which can be analytically distinguished in the process of conceptual abstraction. These relation-frames also ground the diverse aspects of scientific analysis within which relationships and properties may be abstracted from entities and systems. We argue that objectivity can be understood as characteristic of representations that attempt to portray a subject in an earlier relation-frame than that in which it characteristically functions. In short, objectivity is projection. This proposal is exemplified from mathematics and the natural sciences and some possible objections to it are considered, as well as its extension to the social sciences.