A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism

• Published in: Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 45; no. 4; pp. 658 - 695
• Main Author: Neta, Ram
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc 01.12.2011; Wiley-Blackwell; Blackwell Publishing Ltd
• Subjects: A priori knowledge; Belief; Cartesianism; Empirical evidence; Empirical knowledge; Epistemology; Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge; Fallibilism; Headache; Justified beliefs; Memory; Metaphysics; Perceptions; Philosophy; Rationality; Refutation; Epistemology;Philosophy of Science; Fallibilism; Cartesianism; Knowledge
• ISSN: 0029-4624; 1468-0068
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00778.x

According to a doctrine that I call "Cartesianism", knowledge at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess -requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes was right about this much: for S to know that p, S must have reasons for believing that p which are such that S can know, by reflection alone, that she has those reasons, and that she could not possibly have those reasons if p is not true. Where Descartes went wrong was in thinking that our ordinary, fallible, non-theologically grounded sources of belief (e.g., perception, memory, testimony), cannot provide us with such reasons.