Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning

Brown argues against the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. She asserts instead that epistemic standards for practical reasoning vary contextually.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inNoûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 42; no. 2; pp. 167 - 189
Main Author Brown, Jessica
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc 01.06.2008
Blackwell Publishing
Wiley-Blackwell
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
Abstract Brown argues against the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. She asserts instead that epistemic standards for practical reasoning vary contextually.
AbstractList Brown argues against the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. She asserts instead that epistemic standards for practical reasoning vary contextually.
Author Brown, Jessica
Author_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: Jessica
  surname: Brown
  fullname: Brown, Jessica
BackLink http://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=20445446$$DView record in Pascal Francis
BookMark eNqNkFFPHCEUhUljk67an9CENOnjTIEBhnlok2asW6OujavxkSDLWKazYIHV9d_LONYmffK-cJN7zrmXbxfsOO8MABCjEuf63JeYclEgxEVJEBJl7uq63L4Bs5fBDpghRJqCckLfgd0Ye5RLCDEDp8vNdW90KpbGRZvsnYFH7k4Fq1yycQ2VW8H0y8Bj5-8Hs7oxcOHDGnY-wJ9B6WS1GuC5UdE76272wdtODdG8f373wOXh94v2R3FyNj9qv50UmlaoLoSpOlIjzXBDTSUURrXiAgst8Ao1VcMIxR1ijFViRQ1BlDBtTEPwtaYd57TaAx-n3Nvg_2xMTLL3m-DySkkwEgRhirPo07NIxXxlF5TTNsrbYNcqPMgcSxmlPOu-TjodfIzBdFLbpJL1LgVlB4mRHEnLXo5A5QhUjqTlE2m5zQHiv4C_O15h_TJZ7-1gHl7tk4uzy2Xusv_D5O9j8uHf3xiua8xHBsU0tzGZ7ctchd-S11XN5NViLg-uDtt2fipkWz0Cxc-udA
CitedBy_id crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_020_02744_7
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10670_023_00682_7
crossref_primary_10_1017_epi_2015_16
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_020_02774_1
crossref_primary_10_1111_phis_12262
crossref_primary_10_1080_0020174X_2021_1903987
crossref_primary_10_1007_s13164_023_00691_z
crossref_primary_10_1017_can_2022_20
crossref_primary_10_5406_21521123_60_2_03
crossref_primary_10_1007_s44204_024_00143_0
crossref_primary_10_1007_s44204_024_00163_w
crossref_primary_10_1017_epi_2017_30
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11098_018_1123_6
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_013_0361_6
crossref_primary_10_1590_0100_6045_2017_v40n4_cl
crossref_primary_10_3196_004433023836742650
crossref_primary_10_1080_0020174X_2024_2436950
crossref_primary_10_1093_mind_fzae029
crossref_primary_10_1017_epi_2017_26
crossref_primary_10_1111_phpr_12222
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_022_03848_y
crossref_primary_10_1111_phpr_13042
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_020_02977_6
crossref_primary_10_1111_phib_12283
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_020_02996_3
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10670_020_00344_y
crossref_primary_10_1017_epi_2023_55
crossref_primary_10_1017_epi_2011_4
crossref_primary_10_1017_epi_2011_3
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_020_02572_9
crossref_primary_10_1093_analys_anab037
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11098_014_0309_9
crossref_primary_10_1111_phc3_12290
crossref_primary_10_1111_phis_12003
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11098_016_0700_9
crossref_primary_10_1017_epi_2018_26
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11406_022_00557_1
crossref_primary_10_1007_s44204_023_00127_6
crossref_primary_10_1017_apa_2020_16
crossref_primary_10_1215_00318108_1728705
crossref_primary_10_1093_mind_fzw039
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_023_04271_7
crossref_primary_10_1017_epi_2021_23
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_021_03030_w
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_013_0347_4
crossref_primary_10_1080_00048402_2021_2024863
crossref_primary_10_1093_mind_fzae056
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_016_1169_y
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_018_1850_4
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_020_02833_7
crossref_primary_10_1080_09672559_2018_1440952
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11098_010_9544_x
crossref_primary_10_1111_phpr_12523
crossref_primary_10_1080_0020174X_2015_1083468
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_021_03086_8
crossref_primary_10_1111_theo_12221
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11098_016_0792_2
crossref_primary_10_1007_s12136_017_0324_5
crossref_primary_10_1017_epi_2022_22
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_009_9655_0
crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1933_1592_2010_00461_x
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_021_03104_9
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_014_0442_1
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11098_019_01321_0
crossref_primary_10_1007_s12136_013_0215_3
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_021_03153_0
crossref_primary_10_1007_s13194_014_0087_4
crossref_primary_10_1111_mila_12221
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_021_03221_5
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10670_018_0053_1
crossref_primary_10_1111_rati_12217
crossref_primary_10_1093_mind_fzac056
crossref_primary_10_1111_phib_12114
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_017_1567_9
crossref_primary_10_1017_can_2022_2
crossref_primary_10_1111_phpr_12945
crossref_primary_10_1017_epi_2018_36
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11098_021_01672_7
crossref_primary_10_11612_resphil_1947
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_020_02668_2
crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1933_1592_2012_00629_x
crossref_primary_10_1080_0020174X_2021_1970015
crossref_primary_10_1111_phc3_12415
crossref_primary_10_1111_ejop_12026
crossref_primary_10_1080_0020174X_2020_1772865
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_015_0878_y
crossref_primary_10_1093_pq_pqae037
crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1933_1592_2010_00432_x
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_017_1389_9
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1666545
crossref_primary_10_1111_rati_12255
crossref_primary_10_1080_00048402_2011_587438
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_019_02442_z
crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1520_8583_2010_00196_x
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_022_03668_0
crossref_primary_10_1093_pq_pqz006
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_011_9926_4
crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1747_9991_2008_00176_x
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11098_022_01813_6
crossref_primary_10_1111_phpr_12162
crossref_primary_10_1093_pq_pqaa007
crossref_primary_10_1093_pq_pqaa006
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11098_020_01434_x
crossref_primary_10_1080_00048402_2021_2005645
crossref_primary_10_1080_0020174X_2025_2470870
crossref_primary_10_1111_papq_12203
crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1933_1592_2010_00369_x
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10670_017_9926_y
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_024_04687_9
crossref_primary_10_1007_s44204_023_00078_y
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10670_020_00259_8
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_022_03611_3
crossref_primary_10_15448_1984_6746_2017_3_28442
crossref_primary_10_1590_0100_6045_2020_v43n3_nb
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11023_022_09591_0
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10892_022_09405_6
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_016_1027_y
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11229_017_1639_x
crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1933_1592_2012_00628_x
Cites_doi 10.2307/2214070
10.2307/2107917
10.1111/1467-9213.00152
10.1093/0199288038.001.0001
10.1111/0029-4624.00349
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00346.x
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00067.x
10.1215/00318108-111-1-67
10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00013.x
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00387.x
10.2307/2186011
ContentType Journal Article
Copyright Copyright 2008 Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
2008, Copyright the Authors Journal compilation © 2008, Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
2009 INIST-CNRS
Journal compilation ©2008, Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Copyright_xml – notice: Copyright 2008 Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
– notice: 2008, Copyright the Authors Journal compilation © 2008, Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
– notice: 2009 INIST-CNRS
– notice: Journal compilation ©2008, Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
DBID BSCLL
AAYXX
CITATION
IQODW
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x
DatabaseName Istex
CrossRef
Pascal-Francis
DatabaseTitle CrossRef
DatabaseTitleList
DeliveryMethod fulltext_linktorsrc
Discipline Philosophy
EISSN 1468-0068
EndPage 189
ExternalDocumentID 1646680251
20445446
10_1111_j_1468_0068_2008_00677_x
NOUS677
25177161
ark_67375_WNG_DWFCCGM8_C
Genre article
Feature
GroupedDBID --Z
-DZ
-~X
.3N
.4H
.GA
.Y3
05W
0R~
10A
123
1OC
31~
33P
3LD
4.4
50Y
50Z
51W
51Y
52M
52O
52Q
52S
52T
52U
52W
5HH
5LA
5VS
66C
702
7PT
8-0
8-1
8-3
8-4
8-5
8UM
930
A04
AABNI
AACJB
AAESR
AAHHS
AAIKC
AAMNW
AAONW
AAOUF
AASGY
AAXRX
AAZKR
ABBHK
ABCQN
ABCQX
ABCUV
ABDBF
ABEML
ABJNI
ABPFR
ABPPZ
ABPQH
ABPVW
ABSOO
ABXSQ
ABYAD
ACAHQ
ACBKW
ACBWZ
ACCFJ
ACCZN
ACGFS
ACJZB
ACKIV
ACNCT
ACPOU
ACSCC
ACTWD
ACUBG
ACXQS
ACZ
ADACV
ADBBV
ADEMA
ADEOM
ADIZJ
ADKYN
ADMGS
ADMHG
ADULT
ADXAS
ADZMN
AEEZP
AEIGN
AEIMD
AEQDE
AEUPB
AEUQT
AEUYR
AFBPY
AFEBI
AFFPM
AFGKR
AFKFF
AFPWT
AFXHP
AFZJQ
AHBTC
AIFKG
AIURR
AIWBW
AJBDE
ALAGY
ALEEW
ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS
ALUQN
AMBMR
AMYDB
ASPBG
ASTYK
AVWKF
AZBYB
AZFZN
AZVAB
BAFTC
BDRZF
BFHJK
BMXJE
BNVMJ
BQESF
BROTX
BRXPI
BSCLL
BY8
CAG
COF
D-C
D-D
DCZOG
DPXWK
DR2
DRFUL
DRSSH
DU5
EAD
EAP
EBS
EHI
EJD
EMK
ESX
F00
F01
FEDTE
FVMVE
G-S
G.N
G50
GODZA
HGD
HGLYW
HMHOC
HVGLF
HZI
HZ~
H~9
IHE
IPSME
IX1
J0M
JAAYA
JAS
JBMMH
JBZCM
JENOY
JHFFW
JKQEH
JLEZI
JLXEF
JPL
JSODD
JST
K48
L7B
LATKE
LC2
LC4
LEEKS
LH4
LITHE
LOXES
LP6
LP7
LUTES
LW6
LYRES
MEWTI
MK4
MRFUL
MRSSH
MSFUL
MSSSH
MVM
MXFUL
MXSSH
N04
N06
N9A
NF~
O66
O9-
OIG
P2P
P2W
P2Y
P4C
PQQKQ
Q.N
Q11
QB0
R.K
ROL
RX1
SA0
SUPJJ
TN5
UB1
UBC
UKR
W8V
W99
WBKPD
WGLLI
WIH
WII
WOHZO
WQZ
WRC
WSUWO
WXSBR
XG1
XSW
YXE
~IA
~WP
AAMMB
AANHP
AAYCA
ABAWQ
ACHJO
ACRPL
ACYXJ
ADNMO
AEFGJ
AEYWJ
AFWVQ
AGQPQ
AGXDD
AIDQK
AIDYY
ALVPJ
ACUHS
AAYXX
AGHNM
CITATION
08R
AALRV
ABFLS
ABPTK
ACXME
ADDAD
AFDAS
AFVGU
AGJLS
AIHXQ
AJYWA
IQODW
PQEST
UMP
ID FETCH-LOGICAL-c4307-8e3f270c5194e38a107a6818c81d09395241f055538d4e20425cee921bc4f6643
IEDL.DBID DR2
ISSN 0029-4624
IngestDate Sun Jul 13 04:38:06 EDT 2025
Tue Sep 20 21:48:44 EDT 2022
Thu Apr 24 23:03:23 EDT 2025
Tue Jul 01 00:41:22 EDT 2025
Wed Jan 22 16:25:46 EST 2025
Thu Jul 03 21:12:53 EDT 2025
Wed Oct 30 09:53:27 EDT 2024
IsPeerReviewed true
IsScholarly true
Issue 2
Keywords Knowledge theory
Language English
License CC BY 4.0
LinkModel DirectLink
MergedId FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-c4307-8e3f270c5194e38a107a6818c81d09395241f055538d4e20425cee921bc4f6643
Notes ark:/67375/WNG-DWFCCGM8-C
istex:EF6454407E0BD151C53B4A7EEDF4E29DE50C0255
ArticleID:NOUS677
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
PQID 210820141
PQPubID 35832
PageCount 23
ParticipantIDs proquest_journals_210820141
pascalfrancis_primary_20445446
crossref_citationtrail_10_1111_j_1468_0068_2008_00677_x
crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1468_0068_2008_00677_x
wiley_primary_10_1111_j_1468_0068_2008_00677_x_NOUS677
jstor_primary_25177161
istex_primary_ark_67375_WNG_DWFCCGM8_C
ProviderPackageCode CITATION
AAYXX
PublicationCentury 2000
PublicationDate June 2008
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD 2008-06-01
PublicationDate_xml – month: 06
  year: 2008
  text: June 2008
PublicationDecade 2000
PublicationPlace Malden, USA
PublicationPlace_xml – name: Malden, USA
– name: Malden, MA
– name: Oxford
PublicationTitle Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana)
PublicationYear 2008
Publisher Blackwell Publishing Inc
Blackwell Publishing
Wiley-Blackwell
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Publisher_xml – name: Blackwell Publishing Inc
– name: Blackwell Publishing
– name: Wiley-Blackwell
– name: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
References DeRose, Keith. 1995. 'Solving the Sceptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104: 1-52. Page references from K. DeRose and T. Warfield, eds., Scepticism, OUP: Oxford, 1999, 183-219.
DeRose, Keith. 2002. 'Assertion, Knowledge and Context. Philosophical Review.
DeRose, Keith. 2004. 'The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVIII, 346-50.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004. 'Scepticism, Contextualism and Discrimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69:138-55
Cohen, Stewart. 1988. 'How to be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2: 91-123.
Cohen, Stewart. 2000. 'Contextualism and Scepticism. Philosophical Issues 10: 94-107.
Stanley, Jason. 2007. 'Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests and Replies to Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75:168-72.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2001. 'The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. Nous 35:477-514.
Cohen, Stewart. 1999. 'Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 57-89.
DeRose, Keith. 1992. 'Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:913-29.
Hyman, John. 1999. 'How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly 49:433-451.
Stanley, Jason. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests. OUP : Oxford.
Hawthorne, John, and Stanley, Jason. Forthcoming. 'Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2002. 'Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification', Phil. Review 111, 1:67-94.
Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. OUP : Oxford.
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford : OUP
1988; 2
2000
2005a
2000; 10
2004; 69
1999; 49
2002; 111
1999; 13
1995; 104
2005
2004
2003
2002
2007; 75
2004; LXVIII
2001; 35
1992; 52
DeRose Keith (e_1_2_11_9_1) 2002
Hawthorne John (e_1_2_11_14_1)
e_1_2_11_10_1
e_1_2_11_20_1
Williamson T (e_1_2_11_22_1) 2005
Williamson T (e_1_2_11_23_1) 2005
e_1_2_11_12_1
Bach Kent (e_1_2_11_2_1) 2005
e_1_2_11_8_1
e_1_2_11_11_1
Brown Jessica (e_1_2_11_3_1) 2005
e_1_2_11_7_1
e_1_2_11_18_1
e_1_2_11_6_1
e_1_2_11_17_1
e_1_2_11_16_1
e_1_2_11_4_1
e_1_2_11_15_1
Hawthorne John (e_1_2_11_13_1) 2004
e_1_2_11_19_1
Williamson T (e_1_2_11_21_1) 2000
Williamson T (e_1_2_11_24_1)
Cohen Stewart (e_1_2_11_5_1) 1999; 13
References_xml – reference: Stanley, Jason. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests. OUP : Oxford.
– reference: DeRose, Keith. 1992. 'Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:913-29.
– reference: DeRose, Keith. 2002. 'Assertion, Knowledge and Context. Philosophical Review.
– reference: Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004. 'Scepticism, Contextualism and Discrimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69:138-55
– reference: Hawthorne, John, and Stanley, Jason. Forthcoming. 'Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy.
– reference: DeRose, Keith. 1995. 'Solving the Sceptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104: 1-52. Page references from K. DeRose and T. Warfield, eds., Scepticism, OUP: Oxford, 1999, 183-219.
– reference: Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2002. 'Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification', Phil. Review 111, 1:67-94.
– reference: Cohen, Stewart. 1988. 'How to be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2: 91-123.
– reference: Cohen, Stewart. 2000. 'Contextualism and Scepticism. Philosophical Issues 10: 94-107.
– reference: Rysiew, Patrick. 2001. 'The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. Nous 35:477-514.
– reference: Cohen, Stewart. 1999. 'Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 57-89.
– reference: Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. OUP : Oxford.
– reference: Stanley, Jason. 2007. 'Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests and Replies to Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75:168-72.
– reference: Hyman, John. 1999. 'How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly 49:433-451.
– reference: DeRose, Keith. 2004. 'The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVIII, 346-50.
– reference: Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford : OUP
– volume: 10
  start-page: 94
  year: 2000
  end-page: 107
  article-title: Contextualism and Scepticism.
  publication-title: Philosophical Issues
– year: 2005a
– volume: 49
  start-page: 433
  year: 1999
  end-page: 451
  article-title: How Knowledge Works
  publication-title: Philosophical Quarterly
– year: 2005
– volume: 2
  start-page: 91
  year: 1988
  end-page: 123
  article-title: How to be a Fallibilist.
  publication-title: Philosophical Perspectives
– volume: LXVIII
  start-page: 346
  year: 2004
  end-page: 50
  article-title: The Problem with Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism.
  publication-title: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
– volume: 111
  start-page: 67
  issue: 1
  year: 2002
  end-page: 94
  article-title: Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification
  publication-title: Phil. Review
– volume: 75
  start-page: 168
  year: 2007
  end-page: 72
  article-title: Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests and Replies to Critics
  publication-title: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
– volume: 52
  start-page: 913
  year: 1992
  end-page: 29
  article-title: Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.
  publication-title: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
– year: 2002
  article-title: Assertion, Knowledge and Context.
  publication-title: Philosophical Review
– volume: 104
  start-page: 1
  year: 1995
  end-page: 52
  article-title: Solving the Sceptical Problem.
  publication-title: Philosophical Review
– year: 2004
– year: 2003
– article-title: Knowledge and Action.
  publication-title: Journal of Philosophy
– year: 2000
– volume: 35
  start-page: 477
  year: 2001
  end-page: 514
  article-title: The Context‐Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.
  publication-title: Nous
– volume: 13
  start-page: 57
  year: 1999
  end-page: 89
  article-title: Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.
  publication-title: Philosophical Perspectives
– volume: 69
  start-page: 138
  year: 2004
  end-page: 55
  article-title: Scepticism, Contextualism and Discrimination.
  publication-title: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
– volume-title: Philosophical Quarterly Special Edition on Contextualism
  year: 2005
  ident: e_1_2_11_3_1
– volume-title: Oxford Handbook of Analytic Philosophy
  ident: e_1_2_11_24_1
– ident: e_1_2_11_4_1
  doi: 10.2307/2214070
– ident: e_1_2_11_7_1
  doi: 10.2307/2107917
– ident: e_1_2_11_15_1
  doi: 10.1111/1467-9213.00152
– ident: e_1_2_11_18_1
  doi: 10.1093/0199288038.001.0001
– ident: e_1_2_11_20_1
– ident: e_1_2_11_14_1
  article-title: Knowledge and Action.
  publication-title: Journal of Philosophy
– ident: e_1_2_11_16_1
  doi: 10.1111/0029-4624.00349
– ident: e_1_2_11_10_1
  doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00346.x
– volume-title: Contextualism in Philosophy: On Epistemology, Language and Truth
  year: 2005
  ident: e_1_2_11_23_1
– volume: 13
  start-page: 57
  year: 1999
  ident: e_1_2_11_5_1
  article-title: Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.
  publication-title: Philosophical Perspectives
– ident: e_1_2_11_19_1
  doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00067.x
– ident: e_1_2_11_11_1
  doi: 10.1215/00318108-111-1-67
– volume-title: Knowledge and Lotteries
  year: 2004
  ident: e_1_2_11_13_1
– volume-title: Knowledge and Its Limits
  year: 2000
  ident: e_1_2_11_21_1
– ident: e_1_2_11_6_1
  doi: 10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00013.x
– volume-title: Philosophical Quarterly Special Edition on Contextualism
  year: 2005
  ident: e_1_2_11_22_1
– ident: e_1_2_11_12_1
– ident: e_1_2_11_17_1
  doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00387.x
– volume-title: Contextualism in Philosophy: On Epistemology, Language and Truth
  year: 2005
  ident: e_1_2_11_2_1
– ident: e_1_2_11_8_1
  doi: 10.2307/2186011
– year: 2002
  ident: e_1_2_11_9_1
  article-title: Assertion, Knowledge and Context.
  publication-title: Philosophical Review
SSID ssj0000888
Score 2.2180042
Snippet Brown argues against the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. She asserts instead that epistemic standards for practical reasoning vary...
SourceID proquest
pascalfrancis
crossref
wiley
jstor
istex
SourceType Aggregation Database
Index Database
Enrichment Source
Publisher
StartPage 167
SubjectTerms Betting
Cognition & reasoning
Contextualism
Counterexamples
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Intuition
Justified beliefs
Kidneys
Logic
Philosophy
Potatoes
Propriety
Reason
Reasoning
Title Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning
URI https://api.istex.fr/ark:/67375/WNG-DWFCCGM8-C/fulltext.pdf
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25177161
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111%2Fj.1468-0068.2008.00677.x
https://www.proquest.com/docview/210820141
Volume 42
hasFullText 1
inHoldings 1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
link http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwrV1LT9wwEB5VcOHCowWR8pAPVW9ZZWPHcY5o6UJbsSBgBTfLcWIJLQ2ILAg48RP6G_klncljS1APqEJ7ySETbSbj8Tejz98AfJHc8dS4yLdh4nxhrfKNoaug72KXWZkGdBr5YCT3x-LHeXTe8J_oLEytDzFruNHKqPI1LXCTlq8XufLpjENLiZRx3CM8SdQtwkfHL5SklFIt20PIUHRJPf98UGenmien37ekRWJQmhKd6OrpFx14-hLkVrvUcAkm7fvV5JRJ73aa9uzjK-nH93HAMiw2YJbt1NG3Ah_y4iMsHLXTER4-wSEmJur0PD_9PiGqPCVX9r24wwodP-lF-YuZImMIQtnPtrnHRgijGWJpVmsp4fuz49yUVd94FcbDb6eDfb-Z4eBbQfqTKucujAOLQFHkXBmsNo1EkGARJwcJTyJEEI5Ex7jKRB5SCsFtOwn7qRVOIlxag7niqsjXgQnjwkRJpXjGRZYlyuSZwR-CHp4ENvQgbr-Xto3AOc3ZuNSdQkdp8lgzfpM8pu896M8sr2uRjzfYfK1CYmZgbiZEkosjfTba07tnw8Fg70DpgQdrVczMbiSROKxS-x5sd4Lo7w2BEBGW6R5stFGlm8xSaizRCbQJNJdVdLz5H-vR4fgErz7_r-EGLNRsGepBbcLc9OY230JINk23q8X2B5hDJaU
linkProvider Wiley-Blackwell
linkToHtml http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwrV1NT9wwEB1VcCiXtrRFTSngA-KWVTZ2HOdYLSxLYUMFrOBmOU4sISCt2KWiPfET-hv7S5jJx0JQD6iqcskhs9pMxuM3o-c3AJuSO54ZF_k2TJwvrFW-MXQX9F3sciuzgE4jj1M5mogvZ9FZMw6IzsLU-hDzhhutjCpf0wKnhvTTVa58OuTQciJlHPcQUC7SgO-qvjp6pCWllGr5HkKGokvr-esvdfaqRXL7bUtbJA6lmaIbXT3_ogNQH8Pcap8avobL9g1respF72aW9eyvJ-KP_8kFb-BVg2fZ5zoAl-FFUb6Fpa_tgISf7-AQcxM1e_7c_T4mtjzlV7ZX_sAiHb_q-fSKmTJniEPZftvfYykiaYZwmtVySugAdlSYadU6fg-T4c7JYOQ3Yxx8K0iCUhXchXFgESuKgiuDBaeRiBMsQuUg4UmEIMKR7hhXuShCyiK4cydhP7PCSURMK7BQfiuLD8CEcWGipFI85yLPE2WK3OCFuIcngQ09iNsPpm2jcU6jNi51p9ZRmjzWTOAkj-lbD_pzy--1zsczbLaqmJgbmOsL4snFkT5Nd_X26XAw2B0rPfBgpQqa-YOkE4eFat-D9U4UPTwQCBFhpe7BahtWukkuU41VOuE2geayCo9n_2OdHk6O8e7jvxpuwMvRyfhAH-yl-6uwVJNnqCX1CRZm1zfFGiK0WbZerbx7-GMpwA
linkToPdf http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwrV1NT9wwEB0hkBCXlkJRUwr1oeotq2zsOM6x2mWBUgICVnCzHCeWqm1TxC4V5dSf0N_IL2EmH1uCOKCq2ksOmWgzGY_fjJ7fAHyQ3PHMuMi3YeJ8Ya3yjaGroO9il1uZBXQa-TCVe2Px-SK6aPhPdBam1oeYN9xoZVT5mhb4Ze4eL3Ll0xmHlhIp47iHeHJJyEBRhA9PHkhJKaVauoeQoeiyep58UmerWiKv37SsRaJQmil60dXjLzr49CHKrbap0UuYtC9Ys1MmvetZ1rO3j7Qf_48HVuFFg2bZpzr8XsFCUa7BynE7HuHXOhxhZqJWz93vP6fElafsyvbLn1ii4zf9Ov3OTJkzRKHsoO3usRRxNEMwzWoxJXx_dlKYadU4fg3j0c7ZYM9vhjj4VpAApSq4C-PAIlIUBVcGy00jESVYBMpBwpMIIYQj1TGuclGElENw307CfmaFk4iXNmCx_FEWb4AJ48JESaV4zkWeJ8oUucEfoh6eBDb0IG6_l7aNwjkN2vimO5WO0uSxZv4meUzfeNCfW17WKh_PsPlYhcTcwFxNiCUXR_o83dXD89FgsHuo9MCDjSpm5jeSShyWqX0PtjtB9PeGQIgI63QPNtuo0k1qmWqs0Qm1CTSXVXQ8-x_r9Gh8ildv_9XwPSwfD0f6y356sAkrNXOG-lHvYHF2dV1sITybZdvVursHY1coeA
openUrl ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Subject-Sensitive+Invariantism+and+the+Knowledge+Norm+for+Practical+Reasoning&rft.jtitle=No%C3%BBs+%28Bloomington%2C+Indiana%29&rft.au=Brown%2C+Jessica&rft.date=2008-06-01&rft.pub=Blackwell+Publishing&rft.issn=0029-4624&rft.eissn=1468-0068&rft.volume=42&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=167&rft.epage=189&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111%2Fj.1468-0068.2008.00677.x&rft.externalDocID=25177161
thumbnail_l http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/lc.gif&issn=0029-4624&client=summon
thumbnail_m http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/mc.gif&issn=0029-4624&client=summon
thumbnail_s http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/sc.gif&issn=0029-4624&client=summon