Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning
Brown argues against the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. She asserts instead that epistemic standards for practical reasoning vary contextually.
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Published in | Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 42; no. 2; pp. 167 - 189 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Malden, USA
Blackwell Publishing Inc
01.06.2008
Blackwell Publishing Wiley-Blackwell Blackwell Publishing Ltd |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Abstract | Brown argues against the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. She asserts instead that epistemic standards for practical reasoning vary contextually. |
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AbstractList | Brown argues against the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. She asserts instead that epistemic standards for practical reasoning vary contextually. |
Author | Brown, Jessica |
Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Jessica surname: Brown fullname: Brown, Jessica |
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Cites_doi | 10.2307/2214070 10.2307/2107917 10.1111/1467-9213.00152 10.1093/0199288038.001.0001 10.1111/0029-4624.00349 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00346.x 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00067.x 10.1215/00318108-111-1-67 10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00013.x 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00387.x 10.2307/2186011 |
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References | DeRose, Keith. 1995. 'Solving the Sceptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104: 1-52. Page references from K. DeRose and T. Warfield, eds., Scepticism, OUP: Oxford, 1999, 183-219. DeRose, Keith. 2002. 'Assertion, Knowledge and Context. Philosophical Review. DeRose, Keith. 2004. 'The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVIII, 346-50. Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004. 'Scepticism, Contextualism and Discrimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69:138-55 Cohen, Stewart. 1988. 'How to be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2: 91-123. Cohen, Stewart. 2000. 'Contextualism and Scepticism. Philosophical Issues 10: 94-107. Stanley, Jason. 2007. 'Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests and Replies to Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75:168-72. Rysiew, Patrick. 2001. 'The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. Nous 35:477-514. Cohen, Stewart. 1999. 'Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 57-89. DeRose, Keith. 1992. 'Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:913-29. Hyman, John. 1999. 'How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly 49:433-451. Stanley, Jason. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests. OUP : Oxford. Hawthorne, John, and Stanley, Jason. Forthcoming. 'Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy. Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2002. 'Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification', Phil. Review 111, 1:67-94. Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. OUP : Oxford. Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford : OUP 1988; 2 2000 2005a 2000; 10 2004; 69 1999; 49 2002; 111 1999; 13 1995; 104 2005 2004 2003 2002 2007; 75 2004; LXVIII 2001; 35 1992; 52 DeRose Keith (e_1_2_11_9_1) 2002 Hawthorne John (e_1_2_11_14_1) e_1_2_11_10_1 e_1_2_11_20_1 Williamson T (e_1_2_11_22_1) 2005 Williamson T (e_1_2_11_23_1) 2005 e_1_2_11_12_1 Bach Kent (e_1_2_11_2_1) 2005 e_1_2_11_8_1 e_1_2_11_11_1 Brown Jessica (e_1_2_11_3_1) 2005 e_1_2_11_7_1 e_1_2_11_18_1 e_1_2_11_6_1 e_1_2_11_17_1 e_1_2_11_16_1 e_1_2_11_4_1 e_1_2_11_15_1 Hawthorne John (e_1_2_11_13_1) 2004 e_1_2_11_19_1 Williamson T (e_1_2_11_21_1) 2000 Williamson T (e_1_2_11_24_1) Cohen Stewart (e_1_2_11_5_1) 1999; 13 |
References_xml | – reference: Stanley, Jason. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests. OUP : Oxford. – reference: DeRose, Keith. 1992. 'Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:913-29. – reference: DeRose, Keith. 2002. 'Assertion, Knowledge and Context. Philosophical Review. – reference: Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004. 'Scepticism, Contextualism and Discrimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69:138-55 – reference: Hawthorne, John, and Stanley, Jason. Forthcoming. 'Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy. – reference: DeRose, Keith. 1995. 'Solving the Sceptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104: 1-52. Page references from K. DeRose and T. Warfield, eds., Scepticism, OUP: Oxford, 1999, 183-219. – reference: Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2002. 'Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification', Phil. Review 111, 1:67-94. – reference: Cohen, Stewart. 1988. 'How to be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2: 91-123. – reference: Cohen, Stewart. 2000. 'Contextualism and Scepticism. Philosophical Issues 10: 94-107. – reference: Rysiew, Patrick. 2001. 'The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. Nous 35:477-514. – reference: Cohen, Stewart. 1999. 'Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 57-89. – reference: Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. OUP : Oxford. – reference: Stanley, Jason. 2007. 'Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests and Replies to Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75:168-72. – reference: Hyman, John. 1999. 'How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly 49:433-451. – reference: DeRose, Keith. 2004. 'The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVIII, 346-50. – reference: Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford : OUP – volume: 10 start-page: 94 year: 2000 end-page: 107 article-title: Contextualism and Scepticism. publication-title: Philosophical Issues – year: 2005a – volume: 49 start-page: 433 year: 1999 end-page: 451 article-title: How Knowledge Works publication-title: Philosophical Quarterly – year: 2005 – volume: 2 start-page: 91 year: 1988 end-page: 123 article-title: How to be a Fallibilist. publication-title: Philosophical Perspectives – volume: LXVIII start-page: 346 year: 2004 end-page: 50 article-title: The Problem with Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism. publication-title: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research – volume: 111 start-page: 67 issue: 1 year: 2002 end-page: 94 article-title: Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification publication-title: Phil. Review – volume: 75 start-page: 168 year: 2007 end-page: 72 article-title: Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests and Replies to Critics publication-title: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research – volume: 52 start-page: 913 year: 1992 end-page: 29 article-title: Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. publication-title: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research – year: 2002 article-title: Assertion, Knowledge and Context. publication-title: Philosophical Review – volume: 104 start-page: 1 year: 1995 end-page: 52 article-title: Solving the Sceptical Problem. publication-title: Philosophical Review – year: 2004 – year: 2003 – article-title: Knowledge and Action. publication-title: Journal of Philosophy – year: 2000 – volume: 35 start-page: 477 year: 2001 end-page: 514 article-title: The Context‐Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. publication-title: Nous – volume: 13 start-page: 57 year: 1999 end-page: 89 article-title: Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. publication-title: Philosophical Perspectives – volume: 69 start-page: 138 year: 2004 end-page: 55 article-title: Scepticism, Contextualism and Discrimination. publication-title: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research – volume-title: Philosophical Quarterly Special Edition on Contextualism year: 2005 ident: e_1_2_11_3_1 – volume-title: Oxford Handbook of Analytic Philosophy ident: e_1_2_11_24_1 – ident: e_1_2_11_4_1 doi: 10.2307/2214070 – ident: e_1_2_11_7_1 doi: 10.2307/2107917 – ident: e_1_2_11_15_1 doi: 10.1111/1467-9213.00152 – ident: e_1_2_11_18_1 doi: 10.1093/0199288038.001.0001 – ident: e_1_2_11_20_1 – ident: e_1_2_11_14_1 article-title: Knowledge and Action. publication-title: Journal of Philosophy – ident: e_1_2_11_16_1 doi: 10.1111/0029-4624.00349 – ident: e_1_2_11_10_1 doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00346.x – volume-title: Contextualism in Philosophy: On Epistemology, Language and Truth year: 2005 ident: e_1_2_11_23_1 – volume: 13 start-page: 57 year: 1999 ident: e_1_2_11_5_1 article-title: Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. publication-title: Philosophical Perspectives – ident: e_1_2_11_19_1 doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00067.x – ident: e_1_2_11_11_1 doi: 10.1215/00318108-111-1-67 – volume-title: Knowledge and Lotteries year: 2004 ident: e_1_2_11_13_1 – volume-title: Knowledge and Its Limits year: 2000 ident: e_1_2_11_21_1 – ident: e_1_2_11_6_1 doi: 10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00013.x – volume-title: Philosophical Quarterly Special Edition on Contextualism year: 2005 ident: e_1_2_11_22_1 – ident: e_1_2_11_12_1 – ident: e_1_2_11_17_1 doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00387.x – volume-title: Contextualism in Philosophy: On Epistemology, Language and Truth year: 2005 ident: e_1_2_11_2_1 – ident: e_1_2_11_8_1 doi: 10.2307/2186011 – year: 2002 ident: e_1_2_11_9_1 article-title: Assertion, Knowledge and Context. publication-title: Philosophical Review |
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SubjectTerms | Betting Cognition & reasoning Contextualism Counterexamples Epistemology Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge Intuition Justified beliefs Kidneys Logic Philosophy Potatoes Propriety Reason Reasoning |
Title | Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning |
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