Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning

Brown argues against the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. She asserts instead that epistemic standards for practical reasoning vary contextually.

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Bibliographic Details
Published inNoûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 42; no. 2; pp. 167 - 189
Main Author Brown, Jessica
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc 01.06.2008
Blackwell Publishing
Wiley-Blackwell
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects
Betting
Cognition & reasoning
Contextualism
Counterexamples
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Intuition
Justified beliefs
Kidneys
Logic
Philosophy
Potatoes
Propriety
Reason
Reasoning
Knowledge theory
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Summary:Brown argues against the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. She asserts instead that epistemic standards for practical reasoning vary contextually.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-DWFCCGM8-C
istex:EF6454407E0BD151C53B4A7EEDF4E29DE50C0255
ArticleID:NOUS677
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0029-4624
1468-0068
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x