CEO Tenure and R&D investment: founders vs. agents and the Role of independent directors

R&D investment is necessary for firms to pursue innovation. However, few studies have simultaneously investigated the different tenure effects of founder CEOs and agent CEOs on R&D investment. Furthermore, scholars have been increasingly calling for a study of the effects of CEO-board intera...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inTechnology analysis & strategic management Vol. 32; no. 10; pp. 1209 - 1222
Main Authors Hsu, Wen-Tsung, Chen, Hsiang-Lan, Ho, Mei Hsiu-Ching
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Routledge 02.10.2020
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
agent CEO
Agents
Chief executives
founder CEO
Founders
Human capital
independent director
Innovations
Investment
Investments
R&D
R&D investment
Reagents
Research & development
Social capital
Tenure
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Summary:R&D investment is necessary for firms to pursue innovation. However, few studies have simultaneously investigated the different tenure effects of founder CEOs and agent CEOs on R&D investment. Furthermore, scholars have been increasingly calling for a study of the effects of CEO-board interactions on firm strategy. Accordingly, this study examines the differing effects of founder CEO tenure and agent CEO tenure and the moderating influence of independent directors' human and social capital on R&D investment. Regarding the tenure effect on R&D investment, an inverted U-shaped relationship is observed for agent CEOs whereas a negative relationship is noted for founder CEOs. Additionally, the results show that independent directors' industry-specific experience (board human capital) and external directorships (board social capital) positively moderate the relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment.
ISSN:0953-7325
1465-3990
DOI:10.1080/09537325.2020.1757637