Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining

• Published in: Conflict management and peace science Vol. 28; no. 4; pp. 351 - 376
• Main Authors: KRUSTEV, VALENTIN L., MORGAN, T. CLIFTON
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: London, England SAGE 01.09.2011; SAGE Publications; Sage Publications Ltd
• Subjects: Bargaining; Coalitions; Coercion; Cost efficiency; Domestic Politics; Economic costs; Economic models; Economic policy; Economic research; Economic sanctions; Game theory; International sanctions; Modeling; Negotiation; Political power; Realignment; Rent seeking behavior; Resource allocation; Sanctions; State; Trade sanctions; duration; economic sanctions; domestic politics

Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercio...