Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining

Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercio...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inConflict management and peace science Vol. 28; no. 4; pp. 351 - 376
Main Authors KRUSTEV, VALENTIN L., MORGAN, T. CLIFTON
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London, England SAGE 01.09.2011
SAGE Publications
Sage Publications Ltd
Subjects
Bargaining
Coalitions
Coercion
Cost efficiency
Domestic Politics
Economic costs
Economic models
Economic policy
Economic research
Economic sanctions
Game theory
International sanctions
Modeling
Negotiation
Political power
Realignment
Rent seeking behavior
Resource allocation
Sanctions
State
Trade sanctions
duration
economic sanctions
domestic politics
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Summary:Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short episodes. We argue that both bargaining factors and domestic realignments matter, but the influence of bargaining factors declines as a sanctions episode continues while the relevance of domestic realignments increases over time. Our empirical tests, which utilize the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data set, provide support for both the bargaining and domestic realignment approaches, suggesting that unifying them is beneficial.
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ISSN:0738-8942
1549-9219
DOI:10.1177/0738894211413057