Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining
Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercio...
Saved in:
| Published in | Conflict management and peace science Vol. 28; no. 4; pp. 351 - 376 |
|---|---|
| Main Authors | , |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
London, England
SAGE
01.09.2011
SAGE Publications Sage Publications Ltd |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
| Abstract | Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short episodes. We argue that both bargaining factors and domestic realignments matter, but the influence of bargaining factors declines as a sanctions episode continues while the relevance of domestic realignments increases over time. Our empirical tests, which utilize the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data set, provide support for both the bargaining and domestic realignment approaches, suggesting that unifying them is beneficial. |
|---|---|
| AbstractList | Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short episodes. We argue that both bargaining factors and domestic realignments matter, but the influence of bargaining factors declines as a sanctions episode continues while the relevance of domestic realignments increases over time. Our empirical tests, which utilize the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data set, provide support for both the bargaining and domestic realignment approaches, suggesting that unifying them is beneficial. Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short episodes. We argue that both bargaining factors and domestic realignments matter, but the influence of bargaining factors declines as a sanctions episode continues while the relevance of domestic realignments increases over time. Our empirical tests, which utilize the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data set, provide support for both the bargaining and domestic realignment approaches, suggesting that unifying them is beneficial. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.] Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short episodes. We argue that both bargaining factors and domestic realignments matter, but the influence of bargaining factors declines as a sanctions episode continues while the relevance of domestic realignments increases over time. Our empirical tests, which utilize the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data set, provide support for both the bargaining and domestic realignment approaches, suggesting that unifying them is beneficial. Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications |
| Author | KRUSTEV, VALENTIN L. MORGAN, T. CLIFTON |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: VALENTIN L. surname: KRUSTEV fullname: KRUSTEV, VALENTIN L. – sequence: 2 givenname: T. CLIFTON surname: MORGAN fullname: MORGAN, T. CLIFTON |
| BookMark | eNp90c9LwzAUB_AgE9ymdy9CwYNeqvnZNN50TjcY6EHP5TVNR0eXzKQ7-N-bUhEZ6OlB3ud9yeNN0Mg6axA6J_iGEClvsWR5rjglhBOGhTxCYyK4ShUlaoTGfTvt-ydoEsIGYyqlysdoMbdVY9fJXDvrto1OZs543Th7lzy6rQldfHp1bRNrSMBWydJ2xlvoIoE2eQC_hsbGhFN0XEMbzNl3naL3p_nbbJGuXp6Xs_tVqjnNu5RpXamSM-C4KpVgZaakNhzrUgpVgSo1lzUuoeTSEKACZ8LUQlQ1sF4Cm6KrIXfn3cc-frDYNkGbtgVr3D4UCmPGM5WTKK__lYRlEcpcykgvD-jG7eOWbVSKMEY5y7Oo8KC0dyF4Uxc732zBfxYEF_0RisMjxJF0GAmwNr9C__YXg9-EzvmffJpRKajC7As5zpDY |
| CitedBy_id | crossref_primary_10_1111_polp_12299 crossref_primary_10_1080_09512748_2023_2189744 crossref_primary_10_3390_economies11050136 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ejpoleco_2023_102423 crossref_primary_10_1093_isp_ekaa002 crossref_primary_10_1080_10242694_2023_2289820 crossref_primary_10_1080_03050629_2013_751298 crossref_primary_10_1177_2233865916658851 crossref_primary_10_1177_0022343315625760 crossref_primary_10_1111_twec_13350 crossref_primary_10_1017_psrm_2019_58 crossref_primary_10_1177_0022002721994085 crossref_primary_10_1177_00220027231191530 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_euroecorev_2020_103565 crossref_primary_10_1257_jel_20201481 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_euroecorev_2021_103720 crossref_primary_10_1177_0738894213520379 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_euroecorev_2021_103685 crossref_primary_10_1177_0192512117753150 crossref_primary_10_1080_03050629_2015_1037710 crossref_primary_10_1177_0738894217726762 crossref_primary_10_1093_jogss_ogad021 crossref_primary_10_1080_03050629_2017_1373351 crossref_primary_10_1080_10168737_2023_2220300 crossref_primary_10_1177_00223433221087080 crossref_primary_10_1080_03050629_2016_1242584 crossref_primary_10_1177_00220027221139809 crossref_primary_10_1017_S1468109923000014 crossref_primary_10_1093_fpa_orad006 |
| Cites_doi | 10.1177/106591290005300202 10.1177/0022002705276568 10.1017/S0020818300003441 10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x 10.1016/0922-1425(90)90003-B 10.1162/isec.22.2.90 10.3386/w2504 10.1086/261845 10.1017/CBO9780511549366 10.2307/2991817 10.1017/S0020818300027697 10.2307/2010117 10.1080/03050629508434867 10.2307/2615145 10.1162/002081800551127 10.1017/S0003055403000911 10.1177/0022002703262858 10.1017/S0003055405051750 10.1111/0020-8833.00125 10.2307/2669259 10.1080/03050620212099 10.2307/2009785 10.1002/jae.3950040506 10.1080/000368498325507 10.2307/2600674 10.1007/978-1-349-04335-4 10.1162/isec.23.1.66 10.1080/714005349 10.1177/0022002707306811 10.1177/0022002794038002004 10.1017/S0020818303573052 10.2307/2538449 10.1111/0020-8833.00113 10.1177/0022002702046005006 10.1177/0022002790034001001 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1989.tb00200.x 10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800137 10.2307/2669335 10.1177/002234336700400204 10.1080/09636419708429314 10.1177/0738894208097668 10.1080/03050620008434965 10.1177/0022002701045004001 10.2307/2082517 10.1177/106591290005300203 10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 10.1080/03050629508434868 10.1080/03050620590950097 10.1017/CBO9780511790874 |
| ContentType | Journal Article |
| Copyright | Copyright © 2011 Peace Science Society (International) Peace Science Society (International) 2011 |
| Copyright_xml | – notice: Copyright © 2011 Peace Science Society (International) – notice: Peace Science Society (International) 2011 |
| DBID | AAYXX CITATION 7UB 8BJ FQK JBE |
| DOI | 10.1177/0738894211413057 |
| DatabaseName | CrossRef Worldwide Political Science Abstracts International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences International Bibliography of the Social Sciences |
| DatabaseTitle | CrossRef Worldwide Political Science Abstracts International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) |
| DatabaseTitleList | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts CrossRef Worldwide Political Science Abstracts International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) |
| DeliveryMethod | fulltext_linktorsrc |
| Discipline | Law |
| EISSN | 1549-9219 |
| EndPage | 376 |
| ExternalDocumentID | 10_1177_0738894211413057 10.1177_0738894211413057 26275290 |
| GroupedDBID | -~X .2L 01A 0R~ 18M 1~K 29F 2DF 31S 31W 31X 4.4 54M 5GY 5VS 6J9 AABOD AADIR AAJPV AAMGE AAOYI AAPEO AARIX AATAA AAYUO ABAWP ABBHK ABCCA ABFXH ABJNI ABPNF ABQKF ABQPY ABQXT ABRHV ABXSQ ABZLS ACDXX ACFUR ACFZE ACGFO ACGFS ACHQT ACJER ACLZU ACNCT ACOXC ACROE ACSIQ ACTQU ACUIR ADACV ADINF ADLRE ADMHG ADRRZ ADTOS ADULT ADXPE ADZJE AEDXQ AESZF AEUHG AEUIJ AEVPJ AEWDL AEWHI AFKRG AFMOU AFQAA AFUIA AGDVU AGKLV AGNHF AGNWV AHWHD AIOMO AJUZI AJWEG ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS ALNCK ANDLU ARTOV AUTPY AUVAJ AYPQM AZFZN B8S B8T B8Z BDZRT BMVBW BPACV BYIEH CAG CJ0 COF CS3 DG~ DU5 DV7 DV8 EBS EIS EJD EOH ESI FHBDP GROUPED_SAGE_PREMIER_JOURNAL_COLLECTION H13 HF~ HVGLF HZ~ J8X JAAYA JADSL JCYGO JENOY JICEH JKQEH JLEZI JLXEF JPL JSODD JST M4V M4Z N9A O9- P.B P2P Q1R Q7P ROL S01 SA0 SCNPE SFC SGU SGV SSDHQ TEY TFW TN5 UPT VAE ZPLXX ZPPRI -MK -TM .2G 09Z 31T 31V 3YN AACKU AADUE AAGGD AAKTJ AAMFR AANSI AAQDB AAWLO ABEIX ABKRH ABRLO ABTAH ABYTW ACAEP ACOFE ACRYD ACUFS ADEIA ADPEE ADUKL AEOBU AESMA AEXNY AFEET AFFNX AFKBI AHHFK ALJHS ASPBG AVWKF AWYRJ B8O CBRKF CCGJY CEADM DD0 DD~ DOPDO FEDTE Q7O Q7X TDBHL ULY YYP ZY4 ~32 AAYXX ACRPL ADYCS CITATION 7UB 8BJ FQK JBE |
| ID | FETCH-LOGICAL-c428t-3ccd9b43a40db953b697ce40cb759da9bc47f0bab47e1a25065ef55dfa3697ca3 |
| ISSN | 0738-8942 |
| IngestDate | Fri Oct 25 05:28:03 EDT 2024 Fri Oct 25 04:31:25 EDT 2024 Thu Oct 10 17:59:49 EDT 2024 Fri Dec 06 08:31:17 EST 2024 Tue Jul 16 20:44:41 EDT 2024 Wed Dec 11 00:50:50 EST 2024 |
| IsPeerReviewed | true |
| IsScholarly | true |
| Issue | 4 |
| Keywords | duration economic sanctions domestic politics |
| Language | English |
| LinkModel | OpenURL |
| MergedId | FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-c428t-3ccd9b43a40db953b697ce40cb759da9bc47f0bab47e1a25065ef55dfa3697ca3 |
| Notes | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-2 ObjectType-Feature-1 |
| PQID | 1913324386 |
| PQPubID | 2039710 |
| PageCount | 26 |
| ParticipantIDs | proquest_miscellaneous_900346981 proquest_miscellaneous_1364697877 proquest_journals_1913324386 crossref_primary_10_1177_0738894211413057 sage_journals_10_1177_0738894211413057 jstor_primary_26275290 |
| PublicationCentury | 2000 |
| PublicationDate | 20110901 20110900 2011-09-00 |
| PublicationDateYYYYMMDD | 2011-09-01 |
| PublicationDate_xml | – month: 9 year: 2011 text: 20110901 day: 1 |
| PublicationDecade | 2010 |
| PublicationPlace | London, England |
| PublicationPlace_xml | – name: London, England – name: London |
| PublicationTitle | Conflict management and peace science |
| PublicationYear | 2011 |
| Publisher | SAGE SAGE Publications Sage Publications Ltd |
| Publisher_xml | – sequence: 0 name: SAGE – name: SAGE Publications – name: Sage Publications Ltd |
| References | Drezner 2003; 57 Tsebelis 1990; 34 Signorino, Ritter 1999; 43 Major, McGann 2005; 49 Eaton, Engers 1992; 100 Kaempfer, Lowenberg 1988; 73 Dorussen, Mo 2001; 45 Schreiber 1973; 25 Van Bergeijk 1989; 42 Pape 1998; 23 Lektzian, Souva 2007; 51 Slantchev 2003; 97 Baer 1973; 27 Lam 1990; 2 Wagner 2000; 44 Kennan, Wilson 1989; 4 Putnam 1988; 42 Gleditsch 2002; 46 Bolks, Al-Sowayel 2000; 53 Partell, Palmer 1999; 43 Von Amerongen 1980; 5 Bennett, Stam 2000; 26 Fearon 1994; 38 Hart 2000; 53 Lacy, Niou 2004; 66 Blake, Klemm 2006; 43 Miers, Morgan 2002; 28 Morgan, Bapat, Krustev 2009; 26 Allen 2005; 31 Kirshner 1997; 6 Drezner 2000; 54 Morgan, Schwebach 1996; 21 Smith 1996; 21 Zhou 2007 Lindsay 1986; 30 Barber 1979; 55 Brooks 2002; 11 Box-Steffensmeier, Zorn 2001; 45 Galtung 1967; 19 McGillivray, Stam 2004; 48 Diermeier, Stevenson 1999; 43 Leventoglu, Tarar 2005; 99 Mo 1995; 89 Bonetti 1998; 30 Hoffman 1967; 4 Pape 1997; 22 bibr34-0738894211413057 Leeds Brett Ashley (bibr35-0738894211413057) 2007 bibr50-0738894211413057 bibr17-0738894211413057 bibr43-0738894211413057 bibr26-0738894211413057 Hufbauer Gary Clyde (bibr27-0738894211413057) 1990 bibr19-0738894211413057 Kaempfer William H. (bibr29-0738894211413057) 1992 bibr18-0738894211413057 StataCorp (bibr57-0738894211413057) 2003 bibr36-0738894211413057 bibr44-0738894211413057 bibr10-0738894211413057 bibr5-0738894211413057 Rogowski Ronald (bibr52-0738894211413057) 1989 bibr15-0738894211413057 bibr61-0738894211413057 Morgan T. Clifton (bibr45-0738894211413057) 1999 bibr2-0738894211413057 Clawson Patrick (bibr14-0738894211413057) 1993 bibr54-0738894211413057 bibr46-0738894211413057 Tomz Michael (bibr58-0738894211413057) 2006 bibr59-0738894211413057 bibr20-0738894211413057 bibr30-0738894211413057 bibr33-0738894211413057 Wallensteen Peter (bibr63-0738894211413057) 1983 bibr12-0738894211413057 bibr7-0738894211413057 bibr38-0738894211413057 bibr51-0738894211413057 bibr25-0738894211413057 bibr39-0738894211413057 bibr9-0738894211413057 bibr21-0738894211413057 bibr47-0738894211413057 bibr56-0738894211413057 bibr8-0738894211413057 bibr13-0738894211413057 Zhou Wanfeng (bibr64-0738894211413057) 2007 bibr22-0738894211413057 bibr48-0738894211413057 bibr1-0738894211413057 bibr31-0738894211413057 bibr49-0738894211413057 bibr62-0738894211413057 bibr23-0738894211413057 bibr53-0738894211413057 Marshall Monty G. (bibr41-0738894211413057) 2002 bibr32-0738894211413057 Marinov Nikolay (bibr40-0738894211413057) 2002 bibr24-0738894211413057 bibr37-0738894211413057 bibr6-0738894211413057 Banks Arthur S. (bibr4-0738894211413057) 2003 bibr11-0738894211413057 bibr16-0738894211413057 Baldwin David A. (bibr3-0738894211413057) 1985 Kaempfer William H. (bibr28-0738894211413057) 1988; 73 bibr60-0738894211413057 bibr42-0738894211413057 bibr55-0738894211413057 |
| References_xml | – volume: 43 start-page: 389 year: 1999 end-page: 405 article-title: Audience costs and interstate crises: An empirical assessment of Fearon’s model of dispute outcomes publication-title: International Studies Quarterly contributor: fullname: Palmer – volume: 45 start-page: 972 year: 2001 end-page: 988 article-title: Duration models and proportional hazards in political science publication-title: American Journal of Political Science contributor: fullname: Zorn – volume: 5 start-page: 159 year: 1980 end-page: 167 article-title: Economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool publication-title: International Security contributor: fullname: Von Amerongen – volume: 4 start-page: S87 issue: Supplement year: 1989 end-page: S130 article-title: Strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data publication-title: Journal of Applied Econometrics contributor: fullname: Wilson – volume: 99 start-page: 419 year: 2005 end-page: 433 article-title: Pre-negotiation public commitment in domestic and international bargaining publication-title: American Political Science Review contributor: fullname: Tarar – volume: 26 start-page: 92 year: 2009 end-page: 110 article-title: The threat and imposition of economic sanctions, 1971–2000 publication-title: Conflict Management and Peace Science contributor: fullname: Krustev – volume: 53 start-page: 241 year: 2000 end-page: 265 article-title: How long do economic sanctions last? Examining the sanctioning process through duration publication-title: Political Research Quarterly contributor: fullname: Al-Sowayel – volume: 27 start-page: 165 year: 1973 end-page: 179 article-title: Sanctions and security: The League of Nations and the Italian–Ethiopian war, 1935–1936 publication-title: International Organization contributor: fullname: Baer – volume: 28 start-page: 117 year: 2002 end-page: 136 article-title: Multilateral sanctions and foreign policy success: Can too many cooks spoil the broth? publication-title: International Interactions contributor: fullname: Morgan – volume: 34 start-page: 3 year: 1990 end-page: 28 article-title: Are sanctions effective? A game-theoretic analysis publication-title: Journal of Conflict Resolution contributor: fullname: Tsebelis – volume: 6 start-page: 32 year: 1997 end-page: 64 article-title: The microfoundations of economic sanctions publication-title: Security Studies contributor: fullname: Kirshner – volume: 48 start-page: 154 year: 2004 end-page: 172 article-title: Political institutions, coercive diplomacy, and the duration of economic sanctions publication-title: Journal of Conflict Resolution contributor: fullname: Stam – volume: 38 start-page: 236 year: 1994 end-page: 269 article-title: Signaling versus the balance of power and interests: An empirical test of a crisis bargaining model publication-title: Journal of Conflict Resolution contributor: fullname: Fearon – volume: 44 start-page: 469 year: 2000 end-page: 484 article-title: Bargaining and war publication-title: American Journal of Political Science contributor: fullname: Wagner – volume: 11 start-page: 1 year: 2002 end-page: 50 article-title: Sanctions and regime type: What works, and when? publication-title: Security Studies contributor: fullname: Brooks – volume: 51 start-page: 848 year: 2007 end-page: 871 article-title: An institutional theory of sanctions onset and success publication-title: Journal of Conflict Resolution contributor: fullname: Souva – volume: 19 start-page: 378 year: 1967 end-page: 416 article-title: On the effects of international economic sanctions, with examples from the case of Rhodesia publication-title: World Politics contributor: fullname: Galtung – volume: 54 start-page: 73 year: 2000 end-page: 102 article-title: Bargaining, enforcement, and multilateral sanctions: When is cooperation counterproductive? publication-title: International Organization contributor: fullname: Drezner – volume: 2 start-page: 239 year: 1990 end-page: 248 article-title: Economic sanctions and the success of foreign policy goals publication-title: Japan and the World Economy contributor: fullname: Lam – year: 2007 article-title: Dollar falls on housing, trade dispute publication-title: MarketWatch contributor: fullname: Zhou – volume: 30 start-page: 153 year: 1986 end-page: 173 article-title: Trade sanctions as policy instruments publication-title: International Studies Quarterly contributor: fullname: Lindsay – volume: 42 start-page: 385 year: 1989 end-page: 404 article-title: Success and failure in economic sanctions publication-title: Kyklos contributor: fullname: Van Bergeijk – volume: 57 start-page: 643 year: 2003 end-page: 659 article-title: The hidden hand of economic coercion publication-title: International Organization contributor: fullname: Drezner – volume: 73 start-page: 786 year: 1988 end-page: 793 article-title: The theory of international economic sanctions: A public-choice approach publication-title: American Economic Review contributor: fullname: Lowenberg – volume: 22 start-page: 90 year: 1997 end-page: 136 article-title: Why economic sanctions do not work publication-title: International Security contributor: fullname: Pape – volume: 43 start-page: 133 year: 2006 end-page: 149 article-title: Reconsidering the effectiveness of international economic sanctions: An examination of selection bias publication-title: International Politics contributor: fullname: Klemm – volume: 45 start-page: 395 year: 2001 end-page: 426 article-title: Ending economic sanctions: Audience costs and rent-seeking as commitment strategies publication-title: Journal of Conflict Resolution contributor: fullname: Mo – volume: 25 start-page: 387 year: 1973 end-page: 413 article-title: Economic coercion as an instrument of foreign policy: US economic measures against Cuba and the Dominican Republic publication-title: World Politics contributor: fullname: Schreiber – volume: 23 start-page: 66 year: 1998 end-page: 77 article-title: Why economic sanctions do not work publication-title: International Security contributor: fullname: Pape – volume: 97 start-page: 621 year: 2003 end-page: 632 article-title: The principle of convergence in wartime negotiations publication-title: American Political Science Review contributor: fullname: Slantchev – volume: 30 start-page: 805 year: 1998 end-page: 813 article-title: Distinguishing characteristics of degrees of success and failure in economic sanctions episodes publication-title: Applied Economics Letters contributor: fullname: Bonetti – volume: 89 start-page: 914 year: 1995 end-page: 924 article-title: Domestic institutions and international bargaining: Agent veto in two-level games publication-title: American Political Science Review contributor: fullname: Mo – volume: 21 start-page: 229 year: 1996 end-page: 245 article-title: The success and use of economic sanctions publication-title: International Interactions contributor: fullname: Smith – volume: 26 start-page: 179 year: 2000 end-page: 204 article-title: EUGene: A conceptual manual publication-title: International Interactions contributor: fullname: Stam – volume: 43 start-page: 1051 year: 1999 end-page: 1068 article-title: Cabinet survival and competing risks publication-title: American Journal of Political Science contributor: fullname: Stevenson – volume: 55 start-page: 367 year: 1979 end-page: 384 article-title: Economic sanctions as a policy instrument publication-title: International Affairs contributor: fullname: Barber – volume: 49 start-page: 337 issue: 3 year: 2005 end-page: 359 article-title: Caught in the crossfire: ‘Innocent bystanders’ as optimal targets of economic sanctions publication-title: Journal of Conflict Resolution contributor: fullname: McGann – volume: 43 start-page: 115 year: 1999 end-page: 144 article-title: Tau-b or not tau-b: Measuring the similarity of foreign policy positions publication-title: International Studies Quarterly contributor: fullname: Ritter – volume: 100 start-page: 899 year: 1992 end-page: 928 article-title: Sanctions publication-title: Journal of Political Economy contributor: fullname: Engers – volume: 4 start-page: 140 year: 1967 end-page: 160 article-title: The functions of economic sanctions: A comparative analysis publication-title: Journal of Peace Research contributor: fullname: Hoffman – volume: 31 start-page: 117 year: 2005 end-page: 138 article-title: The determinants of economic sanctions success and failure publication-title: International Interactions contributor: fullname: Allen – volume: 66 start-page: 25 year: 2004 end-page: 42 article-title: A theory of economic sanctions and issue linkage: The roles of preferences, information, and threats publication-title: Journal of Politics contributor: fullname: Niou – volume: 42 start-page: 427 year: 1988 end-page: 461 article-title: Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two–level games publication-title: International Organization contributor: fullname: Putnam – volume: 46 start-page: 712 year: 2002 end-page: 724 article-title: Expanded trade and GDP data publication-title: Journal of Conflict Resolution contributor: fullname: Gleditsch – volume: 53 start-page: 267 year: 2000 end-page: 284 article-title: Democracy and the successful use of economic sanctions publication-title: Political Research Quarterly contributor: fullname: Hart – volume: 21 start-page: 247 year: 1996 end-page: 263 article-title: Economic sanctions as instruments of foreign policy: The role of domestic politics publication-title: International Interactions contributor: fullname: Schwebach – ident: bibr8-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/106591290005300202 – ident: bibr39-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/0022002705276568 – start-page: 87 volume-title: Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics year: 1983 ident: bibr63-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Wallensteen Peter – ident: bibr2-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1017/S0020818300003441 – ident: bibr33-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x – year: 2007 ident: bibr64-0738894211413057 publication-title: MarketWatch contributor: fullname: Zhou Wanfeng – volume-title: International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective year: 1992 ident: bibr29-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Kaempfer William H. – ident: bibr34-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1016/0922-1425(90)90003-B – ident: bibr48-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1162/isec.22.2.90 – ident: bibr32-0738894211413057 doi: 10.3386/w2504 – volume-title: Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association year: 2007 ident: bibr35-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Leeds Brett Ashley – volume-title: Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association year: 1999 ident: bibr45-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Morgan T. Clifton – ident: bibr21-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1086/261845 – ident: bibr18-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511549366 – ident: bibr15-0738894211413057 doi: 10.2307/2991817 – volume-title: Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association year: 2006 ident: bibr58-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Tomz Michael – ident: bibr51-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1017/S0020818300027697 – ident: bibr53-0738894211413057 doi: 10.2307/2010117 – ident: bibr56-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1080/03050629508434867 – ident: bibr5-0738894211413057 doi: 10.2307/2615145 – volume-title: Cross-National, Time-Series Archive year: 2003 ident: bibr4-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Banks Arthur S. – ident: bibr19-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1162/002081800551127 – ident: bibr55-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1017/S0003055403000911 – ident: bibr42-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/0022002703262858 – volume-title: Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy year: 1990 ident: bibr27-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Hufbauer Gary Clyde – volume-title: How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? year: 1993 ident: bibr14-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Clawson Patrick – ident: bibr37-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1017/S0003055405051750 – ident: bibr50-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1111/0020-8833.00125 – volume-title: Economic Statecraft year: 1985 ident: bibr3-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Baldwin David A. – volume-title: Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association year: 2002 ident: bibr40-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Marinov Nikolay – ident: bibr62-0738894211413057 doi: 10.2307/2669259 – ident: bibr43-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1080/03050620212099 – ident: bibr23-0738894211413057 doi: 10.2307/2009785 – ident: bibr30-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1002/jae.3950040506 – ident: bibr9-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1080/000368498325507 – ident: bibr38-0738894211413057 doi: 10.2307/2600674 – ident: bibr17-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1007/978-1-349-04335-4 – ident: bibr49-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1162/isec.23.1.66 – volume-title: Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments year: 1989 ident: bibr52-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Rogowski Ronald – ident: bibr12-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1080/714005349 – ident: bibr36-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/0022002707306811 – volume-title: Stata Statistical Software Release 8.0 year: 2003 ident: bibr57-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: StataCorp – ident: bibr22-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/0022002794038002004 – ident: bibr20-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1017/S0020818303573052 – ident: bibr61-0738894211413057 doi: 10.2307/2538449 – ident: bibr54-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1111/0020-8833.00113 – ident: bibr24-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/0022002702046005006 – ident: bibr59-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/0022002790034001001 – ident: bibr60-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1989.tb00200.x – ident: bibr7-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800137 – ident: bibr11-0738894211413057 doi: 10.2307/2669335 – volume-title: Polity IV Project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2002: Dataset users’ manual year: 2002 ident: bibr41-0738894211413057 contributor: fullname: Marshall Monty G. – ident: bibr26-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/002234336700400204 – ident: bibr31-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1080/09636419708429314 – ident: bibr47-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/0738894208097668 – ident: bibr6-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1080/03050620008434965 – ident: bibr16-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/0022002701045004001 – ident: bibr44-0738894211413057 doi: 10.2307/2082517 – ident: bibr25-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1177/106591290005300203 – ident: bibr13-0738894211413057 doi: 10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 – ident: bibr46-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1080/03050629508434868 – volume: 73 start-page: 786 year: 1988 ident: bibr28-0738894211413057 publication-title: American Economic Review contributor: fullname: Kaempfer William H. – ident: bibr1-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1080/03050620590950097 – ident: bibr10-0738894211413057 doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511790874 |
| SSID | ssj0027798 |
| Score | 2.0800161 |
| Snippet | Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive... |
| SourceID | proquest crossref sage jstor |
| SourceType | Aggregation Database Publisher |
| StartPage | 351 |
| SubjectTerms | Bargaining Coalitions Coercion Cost efficiency Domestic Politics Economic costs Economic models Economic policy Economic research Economic sanctions Game theory International sanctions Modeling Negotiation Political power Realignment Rent seeking behavior Resource allocation Sanctions State Trade sanctions |
| Title | Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining |
| URI | https://www.jstor.org/stable/26275290 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0738894211413057 https://www.proquest.com/docview/1913324386 https://search.proquest.com/docview/1364697877 https://search.proquest.com/docview/900346981 |
| Volume | 28 |
| hasFullText | 1 |
| inHoldings | 1 |
| isFullTextHit | |
| isPrint | |
| link | http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwnV3da9swEBdt-rKXsq0rzdYNDUZhBGe2JVnR3rqsI5R2bNBC92QkWYZC65TVZbC_fqcv28la6PZignNIsu6n0510Hwi9I5rpIjd5IkhdJdQwk9hERUmhakVNXvPKufyffi0W5_T4gl30vqouuqRVU_373riS_-EqvAO-2ijZf-Bs1yi8gN_AX3gCh-H5KB4f-ZCUGFwMi9vWT_LOGp-X1zaBho4ebrfB83d4APjJVrl1FSKGOuo8RIoEz9bOC_0GpKeZhC2zE9Q2ZgPGbd1lpd3BLpvJybRjoysa5TAxncyvLus2oKDqD07F8JzBX3Ddf5TIQWjOhM-SNTVBkFKRiCgOg6TNZwNE0YHYJCHprN-Bia8I87dwd9fLtjfbGRhysP_67NZrKbMDcblOuom2bL5EOkJbhz--fT_tLXPuiiZ3H9LfZ39Yb2NFf_EurCvGycAf0KkoZ0_RdrAt8KEHyjO0YZrnaPNE_tpBCw8VHKGCI1Q-4ggUHIGCgdl4BSi4B8oLdP7l6Gy-SEIRjUSDZdkmROtKKEokTSslGFGF4NrQVCvORCWF0pTXqZKKcpNJUIgLZmrGqloSSynJLho1y8bsIawk0ySvM664Bj3WSMNyrTUQ6SpNdTpG7-PUlDc-V0qZxXTya9M4Rrtu7jrC3KbLzgU0sh8nswxL7bbMREZA8yezYozedn-DILS3W7IxyzugIQWFEc84tI0foLHH9rZkajZGB5ZPgx4eGOfLxxK-Qk_6VbOPRu3PO_Ma9NVWvQlo-wN0S42R |
| link.rule.ids | 314,780,784,27924,27925 |
| linkProvider | SAGE Publications |
| openUrl | ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Ending+Economic+Coercion%3A+Domestic+Politics+and+International+Bargaining&rft.jtitle=Conflict+management+and+peace+science&rft.au=Krustev%2C+Valentin+L.&rft.au=Morgan%2C+T.+Clifton&rft.date=2011-09-01&rft.pub=SAGE+Publications&rft.issn=0738-8942&rft.eissn=1549-9219&rft.volume=28&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=351&rft.epage=376&rft_id=info:doi/10.1177%2F0738894211413057&rft.externalDocID=10.1177_0738894211413057 |
| thumbnail_l | http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/lc.gif&issn=0738-8942&client=summon |
| thumbnail_m | http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/mc.gif&issn=0738-8942&client=summon |
| thumbnail_s | http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/sc.gif&issn=0738-8942&client=summon |