CAN RATIONALIST ABDUCTIVISM SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION?

: According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show th...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inPacific philosophical quarterly Vol. 89; no. 2; pp. 151 - 168
Main Author BEEBE, JAMES R.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.06.2008
Subjects
BonJour, Laurence
Epistemology
Logic
Philosophy
Probability
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:: According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show that they are not susceptible to many of the objections that have been lodged against them. I then argue that these purportedly necessary probability claims nevertheless remain deeply problematic and that, as a result, BonJour's proposal fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the problem of induction.
Bibliography:ArticleID:PAPQ314
ark:/67375/WNG-F5D2VK9W-D
istex:B6C4D5E7823994BF7F0D34671208905810319FD2
ISSN:0279-0750
1468-0114
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00314.x