An evaluation of learning in the bilateral winner's curse

Recent research on bilateral bargaining behavior under uncertainty has found that, under asymmetric information, negotiators develop inferior bidding strategies because they fail to incorporate valuable information about the decisions of their opponents. This results in negative profits, or the “win...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inOrganizational behavior and human decision processes Vol. 48; no. 1; pp. 1 - 22
Main Authors Ball, Sheryl B, Bazerman, Max H, Carroll, John S
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier Inc 01.02.1991
Elsevier
Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc
SeriesOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Subjects
Bargaining
Behavior. Attitude
Bilateral
Biological and medical sciences
Decision analysis
Experiments
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Information
Learning
Negotiations
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Social psychology
Statistical analysis
Uncertainty
Human
Learning
Uncertainty
Acquisition process
Decision making
Feedback
Bargaining
Information processing
Adult
Strategy
Cognition
Behavior
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:Recent research on bilateral bargaining behavior under uncertainty has found that, under asymmetric information, negotiators develop inferior bidding strategies because they fail to incorporate valuable information about the decisions of their opponents. This results in negative profits, or the “winner's curse.” The present study provided subjects multiple opportunities for feedback as well as experience in both negotiation roles. Neither learning opportunity eliminates the winner's curse.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0749-5978
1095-9920
DOI:10.1016/0749-5978(91)90002-B