An Application of Automated Mediation to International Climate Treaty Negotiation

A generic framework for automated mediation of multi-attribute negotiation has recently been reported (Lai and Sycara in Group Decis Negot 18:169–187, 2009 ). This framework seeks to shorten time to agreement, achieve agreements that are closer to Pareto optimality, and remain tractable in situation...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGroup decision and negotiation Vol. 24; no. 5; pp. 885 - 903
Main Authors Ding, P., Gerst, M. D., Bang, G., Borsuk, M. E.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.09.2015
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Agreements
Automation
Bargaining
Behavioral decision theory
Biological and Physical Anthropology
Business and Management
Climate change
Climate policy
Decision theory
Emissions
Environmental policy
Greenhouse gases
Group decision making
International agreements
Manycountries
Mediation
Mediators
Negotiations
Pareto efficiency
Pareto optimum
Political economy
Preferences
Studies
Utility functions
Multi-party negotiation
International climate treaty
Win–win
Assisted negotiation
Multiple issues
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Summary:A generic framework for automated mediation of multi-attribute negotiation has recently been reported (Lai and Sycara in Group Decis Negot 18:169–187, 2009 ). This framework seeks to shorten time to agreement, achieve agreements that are closer to Pareto optimality, and remain tractable in situations involving multiple issues, incomplete information, and dynamic reservation utility. These objectives are all relevant to international climate treaty negotiation. Therefore, in this paper, we describe how this mediation framework can be applied to the climate policy setting and articulate a necessary extension to allow for more than two negotiating parties. We then demonstrate application of the framework, employing some simple economic and procedural assumptions. This example shows that automated mediation can add value to the negotiation process without placing an undue mental or computational burden on negotiators. Part of this value comes simply from encouraging negotiators to be explicit about their assumptions and preferences, even if most of this information is not shared with their opponents.
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ISSN:0926-2644
1572-9907
DOI:10.1007/s10726-014-9419-1