Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition

In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may...

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Published inSouthern economic journal Vol. 82; no. 4; pp. 1327 - 1348
Main Authors Vaidya, Samarth, Gupta, Rupayan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Stillwater Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.04.2016
Southern Economic Association
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Abstract In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co-opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.
AbstractList In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co-opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption. Reprinted by permission of Southern Economic Association
In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co-opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.
Author Vaidya, Samarth
Gupta, Rupayan
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Department of Economics, Deakin Business School, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia
Department of Economics, The Gabelli School of Business, Roger Williams University, Bristol, RI 02809, USA; E‐mail
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Snippet In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative...
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SubjectTerms Bribery
Competition
Corruption in government
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Mass media
Title Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition
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