Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition

In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSouthern economic journal Vol. 82; no. 4; pp. 1327 - 1348
Main Authors Vaidya, Samarth, Gupta, Rupayan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Stillwater Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.04.2016
Southern Economic Association
Subjects
Bribery
Competition
Corruption in government
D72
D73
H89
K42
Mass media
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Summary:In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co-opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-GSC9S9X2-1
ArticleID:SOEJ12105
istex:6BB3EC1E97F62E3AC0C224DA55B93C13DD4F14FA
rxgupta@rwu.edu
Department of Economics, Deakin Business School, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia
Department of Economics, The Gabelli School of Business, Roger Williams University, Bristol, RI 02809, USA; E‐mail
.
ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0038-4038
2325-8012
DOI:10.1002/soej.12105