Extremism in revolutionary movements

• Published in: Games and economic behavior Vol. 94; pp. 97 - 121
• Main Author: Shadmehr, Mehdi
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Duluth Elsevier Inc 01.11.2015; Academic Press
• Subjects: Competition; Entrepreneurs; Extremism; Game theory; Political activism; Repression; Repression backlash; Revolution; Revolutionary entrepreneurs; Revolutions; Studies; D74; Competition; Revolutionary entrepreneurs; Extremism; Repression backlash; Repression; Revolution
• ISSN: 0899-8256; 1090-2473
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.003

A revolutionary entrepreneur strategically chooses the revolutionary agenda to maximize the likelihood of revolution. Citizens have different preferences and can contribute varying degrees of support. We show: (1) Extremists exert a disproportionate influence over the revolutionary agenda; (2) Depending on the structure of repression, more severe repression can moderate or radicalize the revolutionary agenda. Specifically, increases in the “minimum punishment” (marginal cost of revolutionary effort at its minimum) radicalize the revolutionary agenda. This presents the elite with a tradeoff between extreme but unlikely revolutions and moderate but likely ones. (3) Competition between revolutionary entrepreneurs can radicalize the revolutionary agenda. •The paper identifies three determinants of extremism in revolutionary movements.•Extreme citizens exert a disproportionate influence over the revolutionary agenda.•Depending on the structure of repression, more repression can moderate or radicalize revolutions.•Competition between revolutionary entrepreneurs can radicalize the revolutionary agenda.•The elite face a tradeoff b/w moderate but likely & radical but unlikely revolutions (political risk).