Global Innovation Contests
The primary objective of this paper is to develop a two-country, dynamic, general equilibrium model with innovation contests to formally analyze the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and se...
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Published in | Games Vol. 14; no. 1; p. 18 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Basel
MDPI AG
01.02.2023
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | The primary objective of this paper is to develop a two-country, dynamic, general equilibrium model with innovation contests to formally analyze the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in which challengers devote resources to R&D, while technology leaders undertake rent-protection activities (RPAs) to prolong the expected duration of their temporary monopoly power by hindering the R&D effort of challengers. The model generates intra-sectoral trade, multinationals, and international outsourcing of investment services. Globalization, captured by a move from autarky to the integrated-world equilibrium, leads to convergence of wages and growth rates. Globalization and long-run growth are either substitutes or complements depending on a country’s relative skill abundance and the ranking of skill intensities between RPAs and R&D services. Trade openness between two countries that possess identical relative skill endowments but differ in size does not affect either country’s long-run growth. |
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ISSN: | 2073-4336 2073-4336 |
DOI: | 10.3390/g14010018 |