Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics

• Published in: Mind Vol. 119; no. 476; pp. 883 - 905
• Main Author: Brower, Jeffrey E.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford Oxford University Press 01.10.2010; Oxford Publishing Limited (England)
• Subjects: Aristotelianism; Aristotle (384-322 BC); Bare particulars; Bundle theory; Common sense; Intuition; Material properties; Metaphysics; Philosophical object; Philosophy; Presentism; Socratic philosophy; Theory
• ISSN: 0026-4423; 1460-2113
• DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzq072

It is standardly assumed that there are three — and only three — ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favoured by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but is structurally identical to the temporal-parts solution preferred by perdurantists. In addition to providing a general characterization of this new type of solution, I discuss certain of its anticipations in the literature on bundle theory, as well as provide a detailed development of it in terms of my own preferred metaphysics of ordinary objects — namely, a distinctive form of substratum theory tracing to Aristotle.