Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism

We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. Th...

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Published inThe American economic review Vol. 105; no. 11; pp. 3416 - 3442
Main Authors Di Tella, Rafael, Perez-Truglia, Ricardo, Babino, Andres, Sigman, Mariano
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Nashville American Economic Association 01.11.2015
Subjects
Altruism
Ambiguity
Cognitive dissonance
Corruption
Deception
Dictators
Economic theory
Experiment design
Fairness
Game theory
Games
Hypotheses
Payments
R&D
Research & development
Self deception
Statistical significance
Studies
Token money
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Summary:We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism.
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ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.20141409