Trade-off between learning and exploitation: The Pareto-optimal versus evolutionarily stable learning schedule in cumulative cultural evolution

• Published in: Theoretical population biology Vol. 91; pp. 37 - 43
• Main Authors: Wakano, Joe Yuichiro, Miura, Chiaki
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: United States Elsevier Inc 01.02.2014
• Subjects: Cultural Evolution; Cumulative culture; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Game Theory; Humans; Learning; Pareto-optimal strategy; Public goods game; Two-stage life history; Two-stage life history; Public goods game; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Pareto-optimal strategy; Cumulative culture
• ISSN: 0040-5809; 1096-0325
• DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2013.09.004

Inheritance of culture is achieved by social learning and improvement is achieved by individual learning. To realize cumulative cultural evolution, social and individual learning should be performed in this order in one’s life. However, it is not clear whether such a learning schedule can evolve by the maximization of individual fitness. Here we study optimal allocation of lifetime to learning and exploitation in a two-stage life history model under a constant environment. We show that the learning schedule by which high cultural level is achieved through cumulative cultural evolution is unlikely to evolve as a result of the maximization of individual fitness, if there exists a trade-off between the time spent in learning and the time spent in exploiting the knowledge that has been learned in earlier stages of one’s life. Collapse of a fully developed culture is predicted by a game-theoretical analysis where individuals behave selfishly, e.g., less learning and more exploiting. The present study suggests that such factors as group selection, the ability of learning-while-working (“on the job training”), or environmental fluctuation might be important in the realization of rapid and cumulative cultural evolution that is observed in humans.