Preference uncertainty in the graph model for conflict resolution

A new preference structure is introduced into the graph model for conflict resolution. This structure can handle a decision-maker's (DM) strict preference for one state or scenario over another, equal preference for states, and uncertain or unknown preference in the comparison of two states. Bu...

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Published inIEEE transactions on systems, man and cybernetics. Part A, Systems and humans Vol. 34; no. 4; pp. 507 - 520
Main Authors Li, K.W., Hipel, K.W., Kilgour, D.M., Liping Fang
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.07.2004
Subjects
Delta modulation
Design engineering
Game theory
Humans
Industrial engineering
Mathematics
Nash equilibrium
Stability
Systems engineering and theory
Uncertainty
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Summary:A new preference structure is introduced into the graph model for conflict resolution. This structure can handle a decision-maker's (DM) strict preference for one state or scenario over another, equal preference for states, and uncertain or unknown preference in the comparison of two states. Built upon this preference structure, four types of solution definitions modeling human behavior under conflict are extended to accommodate uncertainty in preferences. Four distinct ways to consider uncertain preference information are identified, producing sixteen extended stability definitions. Interrelationships of these definitions within and across the four definition sets are investigated. Illustrative examples of two-DM and multi-DM conflict models are presented to show how the new solution concepts can be applied in practice.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:1083-4427
1558-2426
DOI:10.1109/TSMCA.2004.826282