Strategic bias, herding behaviour and economic forecasts

Professional forecasters can have other objectives as well as minimizing expected squared forecast errors. This paper studies whether the people or companies which make forecasts behave strategically with the aim of maximizing aspects such as publicity, salary or their prestige, or more generally to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of forecasting Vol. 22; no. 1; pp. 67 - 77
Main Author Pons-Novell, Jordi
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chichester, UK John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 01.01.2003
Wiley Periodicals Inc
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Summary:Professional forecasters can have other objectives as well as minimizing expected squared forecast errors. This paper studies whether the people or companies which make forecasts behave strategically with the aim of maximizing aspects such as publicity, salary or their prestige, or more generally to minimize some loss function; or whether, on the contrary, they make forecasts which resemble consensus forecasts (herding behaviour). This study also analyses whether, as forecasters gain more reputation and experience, they make more radical forecasts, that is, they deviate further from the consensus. For this the Livingston Survey is used, a panel of experts who make forecasts on the future evolution of the United States economy. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliography:ArticleID:FOR860
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istex:D0F26EB75A73A4A4C7A86D1AEFE19AA304F07C95
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología - No. SEC2002-03212.
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SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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content type line 23
ISSN:0277-6693
1099-131X
DOI:10.1002/for.860