Strategic bias, herding behaviour and economic forecasts
Professional forecasters can have other objectives as well as minimizing expected squared forecast errors. This paper studies whether the people or companies which make forecasts behave strategically with the aim of maximizing aspects such as publicity, salary or their prestige, or more generally to...
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Published in | Journal of forecasting Vol. 22; no. 1; pp. 67 - 77 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Chichester, UK
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
01.01.2003
Wiley Periodicals Inc |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Professional forecasters can have other objectives as well as minimizing expected squared forecast errors. This paper studies whether the people or companies which make forecasts behave strategically with the aim of maximizing aspects such as publicity, salary or their prestige, or more generally to minimize some loss function; or whether, on the contrary, they make forecasts which resemble consensus forecasts (herding behaviour). This study also analyses whether, as forecasters gain more reputation and experience, they make more radical forecasts, that is, they deviate further from the consensus. For this the Livingston Survey is used, a panel of experts who make forecasts on the future evolution of the United States economy. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
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Bibliography: | ArticleID:FOR860 ark:/67375/WNG-S6ZRD6RS-V istex:D0F26EB75A73A4A4C7A86D1AEFE19AA304F07C95 Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología - No. SEC2002-03212. ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0277-6693 1099-131X |
DOI: | 10.1002/for.860 |