Asymmetric conflict: Structures, strategies, and settlement

Our target article modeled conflict within and between groups as an asymmetric game of strategy and developed a framework to explain the evolved neurobiological, psychological, and sociocultural mechanisms underlying attack and defense. Twenty-seven commentaries add insights from diverse disciplines...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Behavioral and brain sciences Vol. 42; p. e145
Main Authors De Dreu, Carsten K. W., Gross, Jörg
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.01.2019
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Summary:Our target article modeled conflict within and between groups as an asymmetric game of strategy and developed a framework to explain the evolved neurobiological, psychological, and sociocultural mechanisms underlying attack and defense. Twenty-seven commentaries add insights from diverse disciplines, such as animal biology, evolutionary game theory, human neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, and political science, that collectively extend and supplement this model in three ways. Here we draw attention to the superordinate structure of attack and defense, and its subordinate means to meet the end of status quo maintenance versus change, and we discuss (1) how variations in conflict structure and power disparities between antagonists can impact strategy selection and behavior during attack and defense; (2) how the positions of attack and defense emerge endogenously and are subject to rhetoric and propaganda; and (3) how psychological and economic interventions can transform attacker-defender conflicts into coordination games that allow mutual gains and dispute resolution.
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ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X1900116X