A Game-Theoretic Model of Cholera with Optimal Personal Protection Strategies

Cholera is an acute gastro-intestinal infection that affects millions of people throughout the world each year, primarily but not exclusively in developing countries. Because of its public health ramifications, considerable mathematical attention has been paid to the disease. Here we consider one ne...

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Published inBulletin of mathematical biology Vol. 80; no. 10; pp. 2580 - 2599
Main Authors Kobe, Julia, Pritchard, Neil, Short, Ziaqueria, Erovenko, Igor V., Rychtář, Jan, Rowell, Jonathan T.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.10.2018
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Cell Biology
Cholera
Developing countries
Game theory
Infections
Intestine
LDCs
Life Sciences
Mathematical and Computational Biology
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Original Article
Public health
Vaccination
Vibrio cholerae
Water consumption
Waterborne diseases
Personal protection
Cholera
ESS
Game theory
Vaccination
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Summary:Cholera is an acute gastro-intestinal infection that affects millions of people throughout the world each year, primarily but not exclusively in developing countries. Because of its public health ramifications, considerable mathematical attention has been paid to the disease. Here we consider one neglected aspect of combating cholera: personal participation in anti-cholera interventions. We construct a game-theoretic model of cholera in which individuals choose whether to participate in either vaccination or clean water consumption programs under assumed costs. We find that relying upon individual compliance significantly lowers the incidence of the disease as long as the cost of intervention is sufficiently low, but does not eliminate it. The relative costs of the measures determined whether a population preferentially adopts a single preventative measure or employs the measure with the strongest early adoption.
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ISSN:0092-8240
1522-9602
DOI:10.1007/s11538-018-0476-5