Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters

It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations (Rowlands 2011, 2012, 2017). In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences fol...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe journal of ethics Vol. 22; no. 3/4; pp. 283 - 310
Main Authors Monsó, Susana, Benz-Schwarzburg, Judith, Bremhorst, Annika
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.12.2018
Springer Netherlands
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Animal care
Animal cognition
Education
Ethics
Morality
Philosophy
Political Philosophy
Welfare
Moral emotions
Capabilities approach
Harm
Animal ethics
Nonhuman animals
Animal morality
Welfarism
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Summary:It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations (Rowlands 2011, 2012, 2017). In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2004, 2007), we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails a harm that cannot be fully explained in terms of hedonistic welfare. We explore the implications of this idea for the assessment of current practices involving animals.
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ISSN:1382-4554
1572-8609
DOI:10.1007/s10892-018-9275-3