Big tech mergers

•We identify the acquisition of potential and actual competitors as a pressing issue for merger control in digital industries.•We develop a simple framework to analyze the acquisition of potential competitors.•We sketch a few recent theories of harm of horizontal and conglomerate mergers in digital...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInformation economics and policy Vol. 54; p. 100868
Main Authors Motta, Massimo, Peitz, Martin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.03.2021
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Subjects
Companies
Competitors
Conglomerate mergers
Digital markets
Digital media
Industry
Merger policy
Mergers
Potential competition
Merger policy
Potential competition
L41
K21
Digital markets
Conglomerate mergers
L13
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Summary:•We identify the acquisition of potential and actual competitors as a pressing issue for merger control in digital industries.•We develop a simple framework to analyze the acquisition of potential competitors.•We sketch a few recent theories of harm of horizontal and conglomerate mergers in digital industries.•We draw some policy recommendations on how to deal with big tech mergers. Big tech mergers are frequently occurring events. What are the competitive effects of these mergers? With the help of a simple model we identify the acquisition of potential competitors as a pressing issue for merger control in digital industries. We also sketch a few recent theories of harm of horizontal and conglomerate mergers that are potentially relevant in digital industries. Finally, we draw some policy recommendations on how to deal with mergers in such industries.
ISSN:0167-6245
1873-5975
DOI:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100868