The political hourglass: opportunistic behavior in local government policy decisions

The aim of this article is to determine whether there is opportunistic behavior in local government decisions related to contracting out, public-private partnership (PPP) and/or public externalization. Analysis of the results obtained from applying a fixed effects panel data model to a sample of 2,2...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInternational public management journal Vol. 25; no. 5; pp. 767 - 784
Main Authors Higuera-Molina, Emilio J. de la, Esteve, Marc, Plata-Díaz, Ana M., Zafra-Gómez, José L.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Stamford Routledge 01.10.2022
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Behavior
Capital
Elections
Expenditures
Government contracts
Local government
Panel data
Probability
Public policy
Public private partnerships
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Summary:The aim of this article is to determine whether there is opportunistic behavior in local government decisions related to contracting out, public-private partnership (PPP) and/or public externalization. Analysis of the results obtained from applying a fixed effects panel data model to a sample of 2,274 Spanish municipalities supports the existence of asymmetric opportunistic behavior. Specifically, there is strong evidence that in preelection years, there is less likelihood of contracting out and PPP decisions being approved, and a greater probability of public externalization taking place. In post-election years, an increase in capital spending is associated with a lower probability of contracting out and of PPP. An increase in current spending in preelection years reduces the probability of decisions being taken on contracting out and PPP. These empirical results highlight the extent of opportunistic behavior in selecting management forms for the delivery of local government services.
ISSN:1096-7494
1559-3169
DOI:10.1080/10967494.2021.1905117