Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic

Knowledge requires both freedom and friction. Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the wo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inErkenntnis Vol. 72; no. 2; pp. 151 - 176
Main Author Sher, Gila
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.03.2010
Springer Netherlands
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Cognition & reasoning
Education
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Ethics
Foundationalism
Friction
Intuition
Knowledge
Legal objections
Logic
Logical empiricism
Mathematical objects
Mathematics
Model theory
Ontology
Original Article
Philosophy
Physics
Truth
Traditional Methodology
Formal Property
Logical Principle
Logical Theory
Isomorphic Structure
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Summary:Knowledge requires both freedom and friction. Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of foundationalism as a solution to the problem of friction, an alternative solution in the form of a neo-Quinean model, and the possibility of solving the problem of friction as it applies to logic and the philosophy of logic within that model.
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ISSN:0165-0106
1572-8420
DOI:10.1007/s10670-009-9202-x