The Eligibility of Ethical Naturalism

Perhaps the two main contemporary formulations of ethical naturalism – Synthetic Ethical Naturalism (SEN) and Analytical Descriptivism – seem to conflict with plausible views about cases where moral debate and disagreement is possible. Both lack safeguards to avoid divergence of reference across dif...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPacific philosophical quarterly Vol. 94; no. 1; pp. 1 - 18
Main Author Edwards, Douglas
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden, MA Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.03.2013
Wiley-Blackwell
Subjects
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Ethics
Philosophy
Knowledge theory
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Summary:Perhaps the two main contemporary formulations of ethical naturalism – Synthetic Ethical Naturalism (SEN) and Analytical Descriptivism – seem to conflict with plausible views about cases where moral debate and disagreement is possible. Both lack safeguards to avoid divergence of reference across different communities, which can scupper the prospects for genuine moral disagreement. I explore the prospects for supplementing both views with Lewis's notion of eligibility, arguing that this can solve the problem for a modified form of analytical descriptivism, and for a modified form of SEN too (though perhaps more controversially). I close by considering the appropriateness of using the notions of eligibility and joint‐carving in ethics.
Bibliography:istex:52115485B5E6A70960A43E7C3DB7481CC1F69F07
ark:/67375/WNG-T8MXK53V-X
ArticleID:PAPQ1441
ISSN:0279-0750
1468-0114
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01441.x