Subjects in the lab, activists in the field: public goods and punishment

We compare standard (laboratory) and non-standard (field) subject pool behavior in an extensive form public goods game with random punishment. Our experimental investigation is motivated by real-world ‘Activists’ encouraging public goods provision by firms; an activity known as corporate social resp...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEurasian economic review Vol. 10; no. 3; pp. 533 - 553
Main Authors Dave, Chetan, Hamre, Sjur, Kephart, Curtis, Reuben, Alicja
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cham Springer International Publishing 01.09.2020
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Activists
Economics
Economics and Finance
Laboratories
Original Paper
Public goods
Punishment
Social responsibility
Punishment
D64
Public goods
Non-standard subject pool
C93
C92
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Summary:We compare standard (laboratory) and non-standard (field) subject pool behavior in an extensive form public goods game with random punishment. Our experimental investigation is motivated by real-world ‘Activists’ encouraging public goods provision by firms; an activity known as corporate social responsibility. We find that relative to laboratory subjects, activists in Mumbai are more willing to settle at the Nash equilibrium of the game (which entails increased provision of public goods) and are more willing to punish non-cooperative firm behavior even if such punishments hurt their own payoffs.
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ISSN:1309-422X
2147-429X
DOI:10.1007/s40822-020-00144-3