When charities compete: A laboratory experiment with simultaneous public goods

• Published in: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics Vol. 66; pp. 40 - 57
• Main Authors: Krieg, Justin, Samek, Anya
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier Inc 01.02.2017; Elsevier Science Ltd
• Subjects: Behavioral spillover; Charities; Donations; Fund raising; Games; Laboratories; Laboratory experiment; Monetary incentives; Public good; Public goods; Recognition; Sanctions; Studies; United States > US; C91; Public goods; Laboratory experiment; Behavioral spillover; Recognition; C72
• ISSN: 2214-8043; 2214-8051
• DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.04.009

•We use a laboratory experiment to study behavior when subjects play two public goods games simultaneously.•We vary the incentives for contributing in one of the games.•Monetary incentives in one game increase contributions, even during simultaneous game-play.•Recognition and sanctions show mixed results. What happens when charities compete? We begin to answer this question through a laboratory experiment in which subjects play two public goods games simultaneously. We systematically vary the incentives for contributing in one of the games – investigating the effects of recognition, a bonus conditional on contributing, and non-monetary sanctions – and measure the effect on contributions in both games. Monetary incentives in the form of conditional bonuses increase contributions, even when two games are played simultaneously. However, non-monetary incentives such as recognition and sanctions are less effective than in related literature on games played in isolation. Moreover, we find mixed evidence of a treatment spillover on the un-treated games – bonuses increase contributions initially, recognition decreases contributions, and sanctions have no effect.