The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice. The case of Homo floresiensis

• Published in: Studies in history and philosophy of science. Part A Vol. 44; no. 2; pp. 169 - 177
• Main Authors: Cruz, Helen De, Smedt, Johan De
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford Elsevier Ltd 01.06.2013; Elsevier Science Ltd
• Subjects: Epistemology; Fossils; Historical sciences; History of science; Hominids; Homo floresiensis; Opinions; Paleoanthropology; Paleontology; Peer disagreement; Philosophy of science; Prehistory; Science history; Prehistory; Peer disagreement; Historical sciences; Homo floresiensis; Paleoanthropology
• ISSN: 0039-3681; 1879-2510
• DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.02.002

► We examine the value of peer disagreement through a case study in paleoanthropology. ► Disagreement helps scientists to generate new evidence and re-evaluate old evidence. ► Disagreement mitigates confirmation bias in scientific practice. Epistemic peer disagreement raises interesting questions, both in epistemology and in philosophy of science. When is it reasonable to defer to the opinion of others, and when should we hold fast to our original beliefs? What can we learn from the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with us? A question that has received relatively little attention in these debates is the value of epistemic peer disagreement—can it help us to further epistemic goals, and, if so, how? We investigate this through a recent case in paleoanthropology: the debate on the taxonomic status of Homo floresiensis remains unresolved, with some authors arguing the fossils represent a novel hominin species, and others claiming that they are Homo sapiens with congenital growth disorders. Our examination of this case in the recent history of science provides insights into the value of peer disagreement, indicating that it is especially valuable if one does not straightaway defer to a peer’s conclusions, but nevertheless remains open to a peer’s evidence and arguments.