The Deegan–Packel index for simple games with a priori unions

In this paper we define and axiomatically characterize an extension of the Deegan–Packel index for simple games with a priori unions. A real-world example illustrates this extension.

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Bibliographic Details
Published inQuality & quantity Vol. 45; no. 2; pp. 425 - 439
Main Authors Alonso-Meijide, J. M., Casas-Méndez, B., Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G., Holler, M. J.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.02.2011
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Coalition theory
Coalitions
Decision making
Games
History, theory and methodology
Methodology
Methodology of the Social Sciences
Operations research
Research methods
Social Sciences
Sociology
Symmetry
Theory
Coalition structure
Deegan–Packel index
Simple game
Player
Games
Probability
Deegan-Packel index
Index
Power
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Summary:In this paper we define and axiomatically characterize an extension of the Deegan–Packel index for simple games with a priori unions. A real-world example illustrates this extension.
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ISSN:0033-5177
1573-7845
DOI:10.1007/s11135-009-9306-z