Productivity crowding-out in labor markets with motivated workers

•We consider a labor market with workers of heterogeneous ability and motivation.•We study how the pool of active workers is affected by a wage increase.•Its effect depends on the correlation between ability and motivation.•A wage increase can increase both average ability and motivation of applican...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 151; pp. 199 - 218
Main Authors Barigozzi, Francesca, Burani, Nadia, Raggi, Davide
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.07.2018
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Summary:•We consider a labor market with workers of heterogeneous ability and motivation.•We study how the pool of active workers is affected by a wage increase.•Its effect depends on the correlation between ability and motivation.•A wage increase can increase both average ability and motivation of applicants.•It can also decrease both average ability and motivation of applicants. When workers’ intrinsic motivation matters, a wage increase has mixed consequences on applicants’ productivity and motivation, as shown in public service, healthcare, education and politics. In a simple theoretical framework where ability and motivation are workers’ private information, we rationalize these differentiated responses and identify intuitive conditions for higher wages inducing self-selection of more (or less) productive and motivated workers. The selection patterns depend both on the statistical association between workers’ characteristics and on the difference between the incentivized returns to ability across sectors. We emphasize a crowding-out effect of wage on workers’ productivity that has not been analyzed in the theoretical literature before.
ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.018