Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification

This paper concentrates on a simple and popular theory of perceptual justification known as dogmatism. The author argues that there are cases in which dogmatism predicts that a cognitively penetrated visual experience can elevate the subject from an epistemically bad situation to an epistemically be...

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Published inNoûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 46; no. 2; pp. 201 - 222
Main Author Siegel, Susanna
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc 01.06.2012
Wiley-Blackwell
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects
Cognition & reasoning
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Philosophy
Knowledge theory
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Summary:This paper concentrates on a simple and popular theory of perceptual justification known as dogmatism. The author argues that there are cases in which dogmatism predicts that a cognitively penetrated visual experience can elevate the subject from an epistemically bad situation to an epistemically better one, yet in which it is implausible to suppose that such epistemic elevation takes place.
Bibliography:ArticleID:NOUS786
ark:/67375/WNG-3BF0977W-L
istex:88132E106DEA9382CADB1810A9AD4E00D42E61B3
Thanks to audiences at MIT, St Andrews, Rutgers, Dubrovnik, Stockholm, OSU, Toronto, Kentucky, SMU, NYU, and Oxford, and to Maja Spener, Farid Masrour, Jesse Prinz, Doug Lavin, Alvin Goldman, Benj Hellie, Jessica Wilson, Ned Block, Al Galaburda, Tim Schroeder, Alex Byrne, Justin Broackes, Charles Siewert, Scott Sturgeon, Jason Stanley, Karen Jones, Jim Pryor, Geoge Pappas, Paul Pietroski, Selim Berker, Mohan Matthen, John Hawthorne, and Janet Browne for helpful criticisms and suggestions. For extended discussion, special thanks to Justin Fisher, Jonathan Vogel, Ned Hall, Robert Howell, Roger White, Nico Silins, Sean Kelly, Declan Smithies and David Chalmers.
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0029-4624
1468-0068
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00786.x