IS MEANING FRAUGHT WITH OUGHT?

According to Normativism, what an expression means has immediate implications for how a subject should or may (not) employ that expression. Many view this thesis as imposing substantive constraints upon theories of linguistic meaning. In this paper, I shall not consider that view; instead, I shall a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPacific philosophical quarterly Vol. 90; no. 4; pp. 535 - 555
Main Author WHITING, DANIEL
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.12.2009
Wiley-Blackwell
Subjects
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Linguistics
Philosophy
Epistemology;Philosophy of Science
Normativism
Knowledge theory
Legitimacy
Signification;Meaning
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Summary:According to Normativism, what an expression means has immediate implications for how a subject should or may (not) employ that expression. Many view this thesis as imposing substantive constraints upon theories of linguistic meaning. In this paper, I shall not consider that view; instead, I shall address the prior issue of whether or not one should accept Normativism. Against certain recent prominent lines of attack common to a number of different anti‐Normativist discussions, I shall defend both the Normativist thesis and an attempt to appeal to a certain platitude in its support.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-8JCBX07L-J
ArticleID:PAPQ1354
istex:7185897504A08B1C4FD4A373878CB5A53E31885C
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0279-0750
1468-0114
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01354.x