THE TRUTH NORM OF BELIEF

I argue that, if belief is subject to a norm of truth, then that norm is evaluative rather than prescriptive in character. No prescriptive norm of truth is both plausible as a norm that we are subject to, and also capable of explaining what the truth norm of belief is supposed to explain. Candidate...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPacific philosophical quarterly Vol. 93; no. 1; pp. 8 - 30
Main Author MCHUGH, CONOR
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.03.2012
Wiley-Blackwell
Subjects
Belief & doubt
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Philosophy
Knowledge theory
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Summary:I argue that, if belief is subject to a norm of truth, then that norm is evaluative rather than prescriptive in character. No prescriptive norm of truth is both plausible as a norm that we are subject to, and also capable of explaining what the truth norm of belief is supposed to explain. Candidate prescriptive norms also have implausible consequences for the normative status of withholding belief. An evaluative norm fares better in all of these respects. I propose an evaluative account according to which the goodness of true belief is, in Geach's sense, attributive rather than predicative.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-0L3JRWVX-J
ArticleID:PAPQ1413
istex:C0939F2182B3DDCD4652424FC11BAAD8F37C6176
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0279-0750
1468-0114
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01413.x