Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement

Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system ("default interventionist") model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontologica...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inThinking & reasoning Vol. 23; no. 1; pp. 49 - 80
Main Authors Gürçay, Burcu, Baron, Jonathan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Hove Routledge 02.01.2017
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Cognition & reasoning
dual system
Judgment
Moral judgement
Morality
Personal experiences
process tracing
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system ("default interventionist") model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontological) subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:1354-6783
1464-0708
DOI:10.1080/13546783.2016.1216011