Confabulation: Developing the ‘emotion dysregulation’ hypothesis

• Published in: Cortex Vol. 87; pp. 52 - 61
• Main Authors: Turnbull, Oliver H., Salas, Christian E.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Italy Elsevier Ltd 01.02.2017
• Subjects: Amnesia - psychology; Emotion; Emotion regulation; Emotions - physiology; Executive function; Executive Function - physiology; Humans; Memory; Memory - physiology; Memory Disorders - psychology; Motivation; Motivation - physiology; Neuropsychological Tests; Executive function; Emotion; Motivation; Emotion regulation; Memory
• ISSN: 0010-9452; 1973-8102
• DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2016.09.024

Confabulations offer unique opportunities for establishing the neurobiological basis of delusional thinking. As regards causal factors, a review of the confabulation literature suggests that neither amnesia nor executive impairment can be the sole (or perhaps even the primary) cause of all delusional beliefs – though they may act in concert with other factors. A key perspective in the modern literature is that many delusions have an emotionally positive or ‘wishful’ element, that may serve to modulate or manage emotional experience. Some authors have referred to this perspective as the ‘emotion dysregulation’ hypothesis. In this article we review the theoretical underpinnings of this approach, and develop the idea by suggesting that the positive aspects of confabulatory states may have a role in perpetuating the imbalance between cognitive control and emotion. We draw on existing evidence from fields outside neuropsychology, to argue for three main causal factors: that positive emotions are related to more global or schematic forms of cognitive processing; that positive emotions influence the accuracy of memory recollection; and that positive emotions make people more susceptible to false memories. These findings suggest that the emotions that we want to feel (or do not want to feel) can influence the way we reconstruct past experiences and generate a sense of self – a proposition that bears on a unified theory of delusional belief states.