How can blockchain technology promote food safety in agricultural market?—an evolutionary game analysis

• Published in: Environmental science and pollution research international Vol. 30; no. 40; pp. 93179 - 93198
• Main Authors: Bai, Yanhu, Yang, Zhuodong, Huang, Minmin, Hu, Mingjun, Chen, Shiyu, Luo, Jianli
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.08.2023; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Agricultural technology; Agriculture; Aquatic Pollution; Atmospheric Protection/Air Quality Control/Air Pollution; Blockchain; China; Consumers; Cryptography; Earth and Environmental Science; Ecotoxicology; Environment; Environmental Chemistry; Environmental Health; Environmental science; Evolution; Food; Food Safety; governance; Humans; issues and policy; markets; Punishment; Research Article; Safety; Supervision; Technology; Waste Water Technology; Water Management; Water Pollution Control; China; Agricultural market; Agricultural food safety; Blockchain; Food supply chain; Evolutionary game theory
• ISSN: 1614-7499; 0944-1344; 1614-7499
• DOI: 10.1007/s11356-023-28780-7

The governance of agricultural food safety issues is closely linked to social interests. To promote food safety supervision in the Chinese agricultural markets under the background of blockchain application, this paper develops a partnership comprising vendors, consumers, and the government. Using the theory of evolutionary game combined with the actual situation of China, the evolutionary process simulations of three participants prove that the tripartite subjects can realize a stable state under the specific relationship. Impact investigation results of typical influential factors indicate the following: (1) The behavior of vendors depends on the government’s supervision and consumers’ reporting attitude. Limiting the penalty amount for vendors to 66.7% of speculative gains can shorten the processing time for vendors to comply with the law. (2) Consumers play a vital role in food safety supervision of the agricultural market. The penalty for consumers should be limited to 1/3 of the reward amount. (3) The government’s incentive-oriented and punishment-inhibited policies can promote blockchain technology in supervision. Punishment-inhibited and key influencing parameters can cooperate in obtaining the maximum regulatory benefits. The results of this study have certain reference values for promoting policy formulation and implementing blockchain technology in agricultural food safety supervision.