Perceptual evidence and the capacity view

Susanna Schellenberg defends what she calls a "capacity view" concerning perceptual evidence. In this paper, I raise six challenges to Schellenberg's argument.

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical studies Vol. 173; no. 4; pp. 907 - 914
Main Author Neta, Ram
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.04.2016
Springer Netherlands
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Belief & doubt
Credibility
Defeasible reasoning
Education
Empirical evidence
Empirical knowledge
Empiricism
Epistemology
Ethics
Evidence
Hallucination
Justified beliefs
Metaphysics
Perceptions
Perceptual experiences
Personal experiences
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Tissue oxygenation
Verbs
Perceptual Experience
Representational Content
Perceptual Belief
Perceptual State
Factive Evidence
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Summary:Susanna Schellenberg defends what she calls a "capacity view" concerning perceptual evidence. In this paper, I raise six challenges to Schellenberg's argument.
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-015-0530-1