Tradable emission rights and strategic interaction

The use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy. This paper presents an analysis of how, and under what conditions, emission rights can be used strate...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEnvironmental & resource economics Vol. 3; no. 2; pp. 129 - 151
Main Author von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 01.04.1993
SeriesEnvironmental & Resource Economics
Subjects
imperfect competition
oligopoly
predation
strategic interaction
Tradable emission rights
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Summary:The use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy. This paper presents an analysis of how, and under what conditions, emission rights can be used strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993
ISSN:0924-6460
1573-1502
DOI:10.1007/BF00338781