Attitude towards Risk, Prospect Variability, and the Value of Imperfect Information

The value of imperfect information as it depends upon the decision maker's attitude toward risk is investigated. When comparing the choices made and the prospects accepted by risk-averse decision makers with their risk-neutral counterparts, the definitive relationships both in the uninformed an...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSouthern economic journal Vol. 59; no. 2; pp. 194 - 209
Main Author Lawrence, David B.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chapel Hill, N.C., etc Southern Economic Association and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 01.10.1992
Southern Economic Association
Southern Economic Association and the University of North Carolina
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Summary:The value of imperfect information as it depends upon the decision maker's attitude toward risk is investigated. When comparing the choices made and the prospects accepted by risk-averse decision makers with their risk-neutral counterparts, the definitive relationships both in the uninformed and informed situations do not necessarily lead to definitive statements signing the difference between the value of information to a risk-averter and the value of information to a risk-neutral decision maker. The key is that although the utilization of cost-free, non-useless information increases the expected utility for all decision makers, it does not necessarily leave the riskiness of the optimal prospects unchanged. This aspect is relevant only to the risk-averse decision maker's valuation. In the most general situation, in which both the prior and the preposterior prospects may be different, it is sufficient that the prior distribution of the posterior risk-neutral mean be Rothschild-Stiglitz more variable than the prior risk-neutral optimal prospect.
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content type line 23
ISSN:0038-4038
2325-8012
DOI:10.2307/1060525