SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM

What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth‐bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that...

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Published inThe Southern journal of philosophy Vol. 49; no. 1; pp. 28 - 48
Main Author Edwards, Douglas
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc 01.03.2011
Wiley
Southern Journal of Philosophy
Subjects
Endorsements
Linguistics
Multiculturalism & pluralism
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Truth
Wright (C.)
Pluralism
Alethic
Truth
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Summary:What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth‐bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination pluralism,” that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-BZD6HLND-9
ArticleID:SJP43
istex:F913FA95718AE5EC7C0F4A7B8B2A71AC69DAE7FB
Douglas Edwards works mainly on topics in philosophy of language and metaphysics, with particular interest in theories of truth. He received his PhD in 2008 from the University of St. Andrews and, at the time of writing, is an IRCHSS Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University College Dublin and an Associate Fellow of the Northern Institute of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen.
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ISSN:0038-4283
2041-6962
DOI:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2010.00043.x