Unanimous rules in the laboratory

We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior. Finally...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 102; pp. 179 - 198
Main Authors Bouton, Laurent, Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, Malherbe, Frédéric
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier Inc 01.03.2017
Subjects
Constructive abstention
Framing
Information aggregation
Laboratory experiments
Unanimity rule
Veto power
Information aggregation
Unanimity rule
Constructive abstention
D70
Framing
C92
Laboratory experiments
Veto power
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Summary:We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior. Finally, we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects Veto's welfare properties.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.001