Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo

• Published in: Games and economic behavior Vol. 130; pp. 148 - 178
• Main Authors: Garfinkel, Michelle R., Syropoulos, Constantinos
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Inc 01.11.2021
• Subjects: Destructive wars; Disputes; Output insecurity; Peaceful settlement; Unarmed peace; D30; D74; Destructive wars; Unarmed peace; F51; Disputes; Peaceful settlement; Output insecurity

On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict (or w...