Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo

On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict (or w...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 130; pp. 148 - 178
Main Authors Garfinkel, Michelle R., Syropoulos, Constantinos
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier Inc 01.11.2021
Subjects
Destructive wars
Disputes
Output insecurity
Peaceful settlement
Unarmed peace
D30
D74
Destructive wars
Unarmed peace
F51
Disputes
Peaceful settlement
Output insecurity
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Summary:On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict (or war) that is possibly destructive. With a focus on outcomes that are immune to both unilateral deviations and coalitional deviations, we find that, depending on war's destructive effects, the degree of output security and the initial distribution of resources, peace can, but need not necessarily, emerge in equilibrium. We also find that, ex ante resource transfers without commitments can improve the prospects for peace, but only when the configuration of parameters describing the degree of output security and the degree of war's destruction ensures the possibility of peace without such transfers at least for some sufficiently even initial resource distributions.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.012