Communication without common interest: A signaling experiment

Communication can arise when the interests of speaker and listener diverge if the cost of signaling is high enough that it aligns their interests. But what happens when the cost of signaling is not sufficient to align their interests? Using methods from experimental economics, we test whether theore...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inStudies in history and philosophy of science. Part C, Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences Vol. 83; p. 101295
Main Authors Rubin, Hannah, Bruner, Justin P., O'Connor, Cailin, Huttegger, Simon
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published England Elsevier Ltd 01.10.2020
Subjects
Communication
Humans
Models, Economic
Models, Psychological
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Summary:Communication can arise when the interests of speaker and listener diverge if the cost of signaling is high enough that it aligns their interests. But what happens when the cost of signaling is not sufficient to align their interests? Using methods from experimental economics, we test whether theoretical predictions of a partially informative system of communication are borne out. As our results indicate, partial communication can occur even when interests do not coincide. •Interdisciplinary exploration of the evolution of communication.•Common interest is not necessary for communication.•Subjects learn partially informative communicative systems when interest conflict.
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ISSN:1369-8486
1879-2499
DOI:10.1016/j.shpsc.2020.101295